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  Stock splits are conceptually a very simple corporate event that consists in the 
division  of  each  share  into  a  higher  number  of  shares  of  smaller  par  value.  These 
operations have long been a part of financial markets. Portugal witnessed 26 of these 
operations from 1999 (the year the euro was introduced) to June 2003 essentially due to 
a  legislative  change  that  took  place  when  the  corporate  law  was  adapted  for  the 
introduction of the euro.  
  In this paper stock splits are analyzed in terms of liquidity, risk, signaling and 
ideal  price  range  explanations  that  could  justify  the  sizeable  cumulative  abnormal 
returns (CAR) that we document around both announcement (5-day CAR of 3.8%) and 
ex-dates (5-day CAR of 7.5%). Our evidence shows no significant increase in trading 
volume (in EUR) although the number of trades does seem to increase, suggesting that 
trading by small investors is increased post-split. Our results also uncover an increase in 
the relative bid-ask spread but only for a sample subset of firms with the lowest pre- or 
post-split relative spreads. Our results also suggest, however, that liquidity reasons do 
not seem to be sufficient to explain the observed abnormal returns around the ex-date. A 
surprising  feature  is  that  the  observed  significant  price  increases  were  mainly 
concentrated around the ex-date, in contrast to most available evidence. The signaling 
hypotheses tested were not supported by the evidence presented in this study. These 
operations also cannot be explained by a placement of share prices levels closer to those 
of other Eurozone stock markets as Portuguese share prices levels are clearly much 
lower than the levels observable in those markets.  
  We  also  conducted  a  survey  directed  at  splitting  firm.  This  confirmed  that 
liquidity increases were indeed one of the main objectives pretended by the managers of 
these firms. Most companies, however, considered that this had not been accomplished. 
Another  stated  objective  deemed  important  by  managers  was  share  capital 
simplification. This is puzzling since it is difficult to explain the sizeable wealth effects 
documented with simple changes in the par value itself. Our survey did not support 







   
  Stock splits have long been a puzzling phenomenon to market practitioners and 
researchers.  As  Lakonishok  and  Lev  (1987)  put  it,  “taken  at  face  value,  such 
distributions are just a finer slicing of a given cake – the total market value of the firm – 
and as such should have no effect on firms and investors”. But, in fact, reality tells us a 
very different story. The effects of stock splits are well documented and have caught the 
attention of finance researchers. This simple “cosmetic” operation certainly plays an 
important role in explaining why the average share price in USD has remained within a 
small interval, which contrasts with the huge swings in stock market returns during the 
last decades (Angel, 1997).   
  Portugal has recently witnessed a “wave” of stock splits after the introduction of 
the Euro as the currency for 11 members of the European Union. On January 1
st, 1999 
the quotes of all stocks on the exchanges of all the Euro members were converted to 
euros. As a consequence of the euro introduction, all Portuguese firms (listed or not) 
had  to  convert  their  nominal  capital  to  euros.  Following  this,  several  Portuguese 
companies decided  to split their stock. Twenty six  splits were thus recorded in the 
Portuguese stock market from January 1
st 1999 to June 30, 2003. 
  A study by Alves and Alves (2001) has shed some light over the consequences 
of the 13 stock splits on the Portuguese market that were executed from September 
1999 to October 2000. Their approach was to analyse potential liquidity effects of stock 
splits  and  the  abnormal  returns  observed  around  the  relevant  dates.  They  assumed, 
however, liquidity to be the only rational reason for managers to justify their decision.  
  One of the main reasons the literature puts forward to explain stock splits is in 
effect liquidity. In simple terms, it is argued that the splitting of the stock allows more 
investors to buy the stock, therefore creating a more liquid environment and leading to 
an observable abnormal return around the announcement and ex-dates. 
  A more detailed analysis of this and other possible explanations is made in the 
following sections of this paper in order to set up a framework on which to base the 
hypotheses  that  will  be  tested  subsequently.  As  in  many  fields  of  Economics,  and 
Corporate Finance in particular, there is no clear cut explanation for the popularity of 






Apart  from  liquidity,  other  issues  related  to  stock  splits  which  have  received  the 
attention of the literature include notably the measurement of abnormal returns (either 
in  the  short  or  long-term),  risk  changes,  potential  changes  in  ownership  structure, 
previous price behaviour, managerial signalling  and the issue of an optimal price range. 
  Our  paper  contributes  to  this  literature  by  expanding  the  existing  research 
concerning the Portuguese market in several directions. Apart from using a sample that 
is twice larger than that used by Alves and Alves (2001), and testing several alternative 
explanations  for  the  wealth  effects  of  stock  splits  that  were  not  explored  by  these 
authors. We report evidence that in the Portuguese setting some of the conclusions that 
have been reached in prior research mainly focused on well developed markets do not 
necessary hold in market environments such as the Portuguese.  
  Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of the 
major theoretical and empirical issues related to stock splits. In section 3 an historical 
perspective is made on the recent evolution of the Portuguese Exchange, followed in 
section 4 by the description of data sources and sampling procedures. Section 5 presents 
and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 The Abnormal Returns Associated with Stock Splits 
 
  Stock splits are associated with positive abnormal returns either in the short run 
(around the announcement dates and ex-dates) or in the long term (the evidence here is, 
however, somewhat more mixed).  
  For  instance,  Maloney  and  Mulherin  (1992)  present  evidence  of  a  wealth 
increase  effect  around  the  announcement  and  execution  dates,  for  their  sample  of 
NASDAQ stock splits that occurred between the beginning of 1985 and the end of 
1989. Around the announcement date, they find an important price run-up in the ten 
days leading to this date. These authors also find price increases around the execution 
date, though of smaller magnitude than those recorded for the announcement date. The 
price  increase  is  also  significant  for  the  three  days  starting  on  the  execution  date. 
Maloney  and  Mulherin  argue  that  this  positive  reaction  on  the  ex-date  cannot  be 






try to find support for this price reaction in microstructure components of the stock 
market.  
  Other authors studied the long-term implications of stock splits for abnormal 
stock returns. This is the case of Ikenberry et al. (1996), who looked at both short-term 
and  long-term  excess  returns  (one  and  three  years).  For  the  computation  of 
announcement  abnormal  returns  they  considered  a  five-day  market  adjusted  return 
(from day –2 to day 2). For the entire period they find an abnormal return of 3.38%. The 
results show an abnormal return of 7.93% for the first year following the announcement 
month. For the next two years the returns were not statistically significant, totalling –
0.44% and 1.32% for year two and three, respectively. The authors believe that these 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that favourable information related to the split 
was completely embedded into prices within one year after the announcement. They 
argue that  the evidence  supported what they term as the “self-selection hypothesis” 
which will be detailed in section 2.4 of this paper. 
  Desai and Jain (1997) also focus their attention on long run performance for 
splitting firms. In their study they also analyse the long-term performance associated 
with  reverse  splits.  They  concluded  that  the  stock  splits  abnormal  return  for  the 
announcement month was 7.11%. For the sample of reverse splits the result obtained 
was –4.59%. Confirming the results by Ikenberry et al. (1996), the abnormal returns 
recorded by the authors for year one after the announcement month reached 7.05%, with 
insignificant abnormal returns of 1.02% and 0.72% in years two and three respectively. 
For the sample of reverse splits, they recorded an abnormal return of –10.75% for year 
one but insignificant returns for years two and three. 
  Boehme  (2001)  also  presents  results  on  the  long  long-term  performance 
following the announcement of stock splits. Boehme collected information from a very 
long time frame, comprising 51 years, from 1950 to 2000. The main difference between 
this study and the two previous ones was essentially the employment of a different 
method  for  calculating  long-term  abnormal  returns.  The  author  used  calendar  time 
methodology  based  on  a  four-factor  model.  Boehme  concluded  that  the  previous 
explanations could not fully explain the returns for the period 1975-1987, when value 
weighting  was  applied.  He  proposed  two  explanations:  1)  a  market  microstructure 






abnormal  return;  2)  the  effect  of  chance, eventually  post  announcement  unexpected 
changes  in  systematic  risk.  The  author  concluded  that  there  was  no  persistent  or 
unexplainable long run anomaly connected with stock splits. The author’s evidence of 
abnormal positive performance following the announcement date until the execution 
date was not addressed in his study. 
  Some authors assume that stock splits and stock dividends are essentially the 
same thing (distribution of stock without actual exchange of cash), and add (large) stock 
dividends  to  their  stock  split  samples
1.  Desai  and  Jain  (1997)  replicated  their 
experiment, separating the sample into two sub-samples, one containing all the “pure” 
stock splits and the other containing the stock dividends. They observe that the results 
obtained  are  virtually  unchanged.  Two  further  studies,  however,  report  different 
findings. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) in their search for the reasons why companies 
split their shares, studied separately stock splits and stock dividends. They collected 
data on stock distributions for the period 1963-1982. They documented that the earnings 
and dividend growth rates were higher for stock splitting than for stock dividend firms, 
when compared with control firms. Before the announcement, splitting firms also had a 
substantially higher price (almost 70%) than control firms
2. They find the opposite for 
stock dividends firms. Rankine and Stice (1997) add more complexity to this issue. In 
their study, they meticulously separated stock splits from stock dividends operations. 
For two-for-one stock distributions, the CRSP classification for these operations was in 
accordance  with  their  own  only  in  23%  of  the  occasions.  Another  example  of  the 
confounding definitions of stock splits and stock dividends can be found in McNichols 
and  Dravid  (1990)  who  defined  “SD’s  with  split  factors  of  10-20%  as  large  stock 
dividends  and  SD’s  with  split  factors  greater  than  20%  as  stock  splits”
3.  Stock 
Distributions of less than 10% were considered small stock dividends.  
  A point where there is consensus regarding stock splits is that these operations 
are preceded by a period of abnormal returns before the announcement. Lakonishok and 
Lev (1987), Maloney and Mulherin (1992), Ikenberry et al. (1996) and Boehme (2001) 
all report a significant pre-split price run-up for splitting firms. 
                                                
1 See, for instance, McNichols and Dravid (1990), Pilotte and Manuel (1996), Desai and Jain (1997), 
Boehme (2001) or Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello (2002). 
2 This difference grows as the date of announcement approaches. The issue of the price run-up of splitting 
firms will be addressed later in this paper. 






2.2 Stock Splits and Liquidity Changes 
 
  Although  a  popular  argument  among  practitioners  for  the  rationale  of  stock 
splits, the available empirical evidence is not conclusive on the effects of stock splits on 
liquidity.  
  First, one must consider that liquidity can be measured in many different ways.  
For instance, Wulff (2002) uses the following measures: 
a)  Volume, calculated as the adjusted daily number of shares traded; 
b)  Volume turnover which is calculated as the volume divided by the shares 
outstanding; 
c)  Percentage of days with trades. 
  Another way of thinking about liquidity is by considering the cost of trading. In 
this  issue  most  studies  considered  variations  of  the  relative  bid-ask  spread.  The 
literature shows that there is an increase in the relative bid-ask spread (Copeland, 1979, 
Conroy et al.,1990, Desai et al., 1998 , and Alves and Alves, 2001). 
  Muscarella  and  Vetsuypens  (1996)  uncovered  significant  evidence  lending 
support to the argument that splits improve liquidity. They use a sample of ADR solo-
splits, i.e., splits of ADRs (American Depositary Receipts) without a corresponding split 
in the home country. They find that the market reaction to simultaneous splits was a 
positive 1.13% mean return. For solo splits the results showed higher returns. For the 
total sample the mean return was 2.11% and 2.56% for the “clean” sub-sample (both 
statistically significant).  
  As in other studies, the liquidity premium
4, measured in dollar terms, seems to 
fall  subsequently  to  the  split.  In  contrast,  the  relative  premium  (liquidity  premium 
divided  by  the  transaction  price)  rises  in  a  significant  way.  Maloney  and  Mulherin 
(1992) present in fact evidence of a decrease in the relative spread in the period prior to 
the execution of the split. They also report an increasing level in daily volume traded (in 
dollars)  until  the  ex-date  that  decreases  immediately  after.  They  also  document  a 
reduction in the average daily value per trade. This is accompanied by an increase in the 
number of shareholders. This statistically significant result is also characterized by an 
increase in the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage of the capital 
                                                






held  by  these  investors.  The  authors  argue  that  the  split  allowed  current  small 
shareholders to diversify their wealth by allowing them to sell the split shares in round 
lots.  
  Schultz (2000) also concludes that an increase in small trades occurs subsequent 
to the split. He reports a strong increase in trades that are smaller than the previous 
round lot trade. His conclusion is that a large number of small shareholders are added to 
the  shareholder  base  after  the  split.  This  happens  even  though  an  increase  in  the 
effective spread
5 occurs for all trade sizes considered (all statistically significant). The 
author claims that these increased spreads are a powerful incentive for market makers to 
promote the stock.  
  In  their study of  Canadian stock splits, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996) find 
evidence of an increase in trades conducted by small investors. Since the identity of the 
traders themselves cannot be determined, their proxy was trade size. They try to find 
evidence of an increase in small board-lot trading compared to odd-lot trading after the 
split. They classified each trade as a buy (sell) if the trade was at the ask (bid). For 
trades that occurred between the bid and ask, the algorithm proposed by Lee and Ready 
(1991) was used to classify them as buy or sell orders. For odd-lot trading, all the 
liquidity  measures  (e.g.,  trading  volume,  trading  value,  trading  frequency  and 
transaction size) reported a significant decrease. On the opposite side of small board-lot, 
these variables showed increases in mean values that are significant, with the exception 
of trading volume.  
  Lakonishok and Lev (1987) also addressed the issue of liquidity by analysing 
the monthly turnover for the splitting stocks and a control group. They report that the 
splitting stocks showed a rapid increase in trade volume from around sixty months prior 
to the split announcement up to the announcement date itself. After this the decrease is 
rapid and even more impressive than the increase.  
  Dennis and Strickland (2003) analysed the issue of liquidity by decomposing the 
shareholder ownership composition. Since some authors have found an increase in the 
relative bid-ask spread following the splits, one would expect that institutions would 
dislike  splits,  since  the  relative  bid-ask  spread  is  an  important  cost  they  incur. 















Nonetheless the authors found evidence contradicting this assertion. They conclude that 
the proportion of institutional ownership following a split, conditional on the level of 
prior institutional ownership increased significantly. In terms of abnormal returns, the 
authors found that higher returns were associated with larger increases in institutional 
ownership. 
  Lamoureux and Poon (1987) report an increase in the number of shareholders, 
but the authors did not explore this increase in order to analyse who the new “entrants” 
were (small investors or institutions). 
  Wulff (2002) analyzed 276 stock splits in the Official Market of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange (FSE) from 1960 to 1996. One striking feature he documented was that 
the splits were highly clustered in the years 1967-1970 (1969 alone had 94 splits) and 
1995-1996.  The  author  reasoned  that  the  main  reason  behind  this  clustering  was 
connected with minimum par value rules that were applicable at the time to German 
companies. This restriction lead the author to claim that signalling could not be the main 
reason behind splits as companies did not seem to split when they found this operation 
to be appropriate, but only when the law changed. His analysis concerning liquidity is 
supportive of enhanced liquidity brought about by the split.  
  Alves and Alves (2001) conducted an analysis concerning the liquidity changes 
of stock splits in the Portuguese Exchange. The authors assume that the only real effect 
stock splits may have is liquidity-related. If liquidity is altered due to a split, then real 
effects on prices are to be expected. The period analysed by the authors comprised the 
four  months  prior  and  four  months  following  the  split.  The  evidence  they  reported 
concerning liquidity changes was mixed. In terms of turnover, they observed that eight 
shares experienced an increase in turnover while the other five suffered a decrease. 
  One  area  where  greater  consensus  seems  to  exist  is  that  of  bid-ask  spread 
changes induced by the split. The split itself reduces the price of the share while under 
normal circumstances the bid-ask spread in absolute terms also decreases.  Desai  et  al. 
(1998) investigated changes in spreads after a split. The purpose of their study was to 
decompose the spread into its various components and to observe the influences that 
noise and informed traders had on it. The results in terms of relative spread showed an 






  Conroy at al. (1990) also address the issue of bid-ask spreads. Their sample 
comprises splits from NYSE shares from the January 1981 to April 1983 period. An 
important feature of their study is that the comparisons made were between the two 
months prior to the announcement and the two months following the ex-date. They 
found that mean absolute spreads presented a decrease from 2.53 to 2.31
6. However, in 
relative terms their sample witnessed a statistically significant increase from 0.951% to 
1.229%. These changes in absolute and relative spreads were more intense in the case of 
large splits. 
  Guirao and Sala (2002) studied liquidity effects in Spanish stock splits that took 
place  between  1997  and  1999.  For  their  full  sample  they  do  not  find  evidence  of 
liquidity improvements. Their conclusions changed somewhat when the orders were 
divided  according  to  transaction  size  Small  transactions  and  medium  transactions 
especially on the “buy” side demonstrated a clear liquidity increase in terms of trade 
frequency and volume. The picture was different concerning large transactions. For the 
three sub-samples partitioned by size there was a common feature: the increase of the 
Effective Spread. Guirao and Sala concluded that, much in line with prior literature, 
small investors were drawn in by smaller prices, even though they were charged higher 
post-split transaction cost. 
  For the Portuguese market, Alves and Alves (2001) document a decrease, in 
absolute  terms,  for  all  of  the  thirteen  stocks  that  split.  Nonetheless  their  evidence 
showed an increase in the relative spread.  
  To summarize, there is a relative consensus among researchers concerning the 
decrease in absolute spreads that splits induce. Existing evidence points, however, in the 
opposite  direction  when  the  issue  is  relative  spreads,  which  represent  an  important 
transaction cost to shareholders. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that this increase 
in  the  relative  spread  cost  improves  the  efficiency  of  trading  and  induces  a  higher 
promotion of stocks by dealers. The number of shareholders is also believed to increase, 
including  small  shareholders,  even  though  there  is  some  evidence  that  institutional 
shareholders increase their holdings especially in companies where their holdings are 
smaller. There is also some results (e.g., Ikenberry et al, 1996) suggesting the existence 
of some optimal trading range and that companies tend to plan their split so that the 
                                                






price of their stock stays within its bounds. So, even if the relative spreads cost may 
increase and the volumes may not increase, there still may be better liquidity due to the 
placement of the share price on a more adequate level. 
  What also seems consensual is that liquidity per se lacks explanatory power for 
the abnormal returns associated with stock splits, especially those that have been found 
for the long run. Alternative explanations which have been addressed in the literature 
include risk changes and signalling, topics that we address in the following sections. 
2.3 Risk Changes Induced by Stock Splits 
 
  Although most work surrounding stock splits focus on the effects on prices and 
its  relation  with  liquidity  changes,  some  work  has  also  been  developed  concerning 
changes in risk. 
  Sheikh  (1989)  addressed  this  issue  in  the  context  of  a  study  that  tested  the 
efficiency of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), following previous authors 
that identified a significant increase in volatility subsequent to stock splits with a split 
factor larger than 25%. Even if the causes concerning this increase may not be clear, an 
increase in the price of calls should occur as a consequence of that increase in volatility. 
On the ex-date Sheikh observed a significant increase for the splitting group, with the 
control  group  showing  an  insignificant  decrease.  This  resulted  in  a  statistically 
significant difference between the two groups. The author concludes that the CBOE 
captured the ex-date variance increase as it occurred. 
  Dubofsky  (1991)  conducted  a  study  that  was  basically  an  extension  of  a 
previous study by Ohlson and Penman (1985). In contrast to these authors, Dubofsky 
focused on both NYSE stocks and AMEX stocks and used a large time period from July 
2, 1962 to December 31, 1987. The results obtained for the two exchanges lead the 
author to conclude  there was  a more pronounced increase in  variance connected to 
NYSE stocks. 
  Desai et al. (1998) conducted a more in-depth study of volatility changes. These 
authors reported a significant increase in volatility following the split. Their conclusions 
were stronger than those of Dubofski (1991) since their calculations took into account 






relative bid-ask spread, which in turn lead to the need to estimate volatility with more 
complex procedures. 
  As  Lamoureux  and  Poon  (1987)  state  in  their  analysis  of  stock  splits  (and 
reverse  splits)  for  the  period  between  July  1962  and  December  1985,  “the  market 
impact  of  splits  is  expected  to  be  greatly  diminished”.  They  were  referring  to  the 
introduction of a new tax bill in the U.S., which would eliminate distinctions between 
short-term and long-term capital gains. These authors argued that stock splits lead to an 
increase in variance and this variance was desirable, due to the way capital gains were 
then taxed in the U.S.. Since preferential treatment was given to long-term gains, then 
short-term losses could be used to offset short-term gains. To the authors, this justified 
the desirability of an increase in a stock volatility. Lamoureux and Poon in fact find 
evidence that the market reacted favourably to this increase in diversifiable risk. The 
authors  computed  the  abnormal  returns  associated  with  the  operation  (around  the 
relevant  dates:  execution  date,  announcement  date  and  the  date  of  the  general 
shareholders meeting that approved the stock split), and confronted these results with 
those obtained for liquidity. In general terms, the abnormal returns were positive when 
liquidity improved and negative when it decreased. Lamoureux and Poon concluded 
that the market was efficient in translating to prices the effect of splits on liquidity. 
2.4 Stock Splits and Managerial Signalling 
 
  If stock splits are perceived by market participants as valid signals of the firm’s 
future performance then this could be a possible explanation for the abnormal returns 
associated  with  these  operations.  As  Rankine  and  Stice  (1997)  and  Wulff  (2002) 
observe, it is easier to think about stock dividends as signals concerning the future since 
their cost is clearly discernible in terms of reduced financial flexibility
7. In line with this 
argument, Rankine and Stice (1997) showed that abnormal returns associated with stock 
dividends were higher than those associated with splits.  
  To test if stock splitting companies perform better than the rest of the market, 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) compared their earnings and dividend growth to those of a 
                                                
7 This is due to the reduced ability to pay dividends to shareholders, since most debt covenants and 
regulations link this ability to the level of retained earnings and capital surplus that are used when issuing 






control group. They concluded that the splitting group experienced higher growth rates 
for both variables, but this difference was larger before the announcement than after.  
  The  potential  signalling  nature  of  a  split  can,  however,  be  affected  by 
confounding events potentially related to such operations, namely dividend increases or 
initiations, as suggested by Desai and Jain (1997). Notwithstanding, their sub-sample 
with no dividend increases or initiations also revealed similar significant short-term and 
long-term abnormal returns.  
  Although reverse splits are a far less common phenomenon some authors have 
studied their effects in terms of abnormal returns. The consensual view is that this kind 
of  operation is  associated with short-term and long-term negative abnormal returns. 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) used a NYSE and AMEX sample of reverse splits. They 
concluded that for both dates the abnormal returns were negative especially surrounding 
the ex-date. This is accompanied by an increase in liquidity when measured by the 
trading volume. The fact that returns were negative, even when liquidity increased, lead 
the authors to suggest that reverse splits were clearly seen as a negative signal by the 
market. 
  Similar conclusions are reached by Desai and Jain (1997). For their sample of 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ reverse splits the authors document an announcement 
month  abnormal  return  of  –4.59%.  For  the  first  twelve  months  following  the 
announcement the abnormal return reached –10.76%
8.  
  If splits are a credible signal how can its strength be measured? McNichols and 
Dravid  (1990)  find  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  the  split  factor  itself 
conveys information. They presented and tested a model of management choice of split 
factors. The higher the pre-split price the higher should be the split factor due to the 
need to restore the price to some optimal trading range. Firm size is also controlled 
because the authors believed that bigger firms might desire a higher price. Their results  
confirmed that the split factor was indeed affected by firm size and pre-split price but 
the explanatory power of their proxy of management’s private information was also 
very strong (although smaller than the one of the two other variables).  
  Pilotte and Manuel (1996) provide a study that tried to confirm whether the 
market learned from past experience. They analysed a sample of companies that split at 
                                                
8 For the thirty-six months following the announcement month the cumulative abnormal return was –






least twice during the 1970-1988 period. If the market perceives the split as a signal 
then it should use the past splits experience when it reacts to the current announcement. 
The reasoning is simple: if the company previously disappointed after a split, then the 
reaction  to a  current  split  announcement shouldn’t  be  very  positive.  Except for  the 
seventh  and  eighth  splits  conducted  by  sample companies,  all  were associated  with 
significant increases in earnings. This was analysed for years –2 to +4 with 0 being the 
split year. This abnormal performance seemed to decrease in duration as the frequency 
of  splits  increased.  The  evidence  reported  by  the  authors  confirmed  that  the 
standardized earnings changes for the announcement year and the following year were 
statistically significant in explaining the announcement date abnormal return
9. For the 
authors this proved that the splits were informative. 
  Conroy and Harris (1999) also used the experience of past splits to explain the 
current ones. They claimed that managers designed the operations so that the post-split 
price achieved would be the same as the one after previous splits. In their regression 
analysis they included, besides the lagged split price, the current market-wide average 
price, the industry current average price and the current size-group average price as 
explanatory variables. The use of the lagged split price as explanatory variable greatly 
increased the explanatory power of their regressions. Conroy and Harris also tried to 
explain the origin of the abnormal returns associated with the split announcements. The 
split  factor,  the  target  split  price  and  firm  size  were  all  found  to  be  significant 
explanatory variables. The regression explanatory power was increased when the split 
factor  surprise  was  considered.  This  last  variable  was  calculated  as  the  difference 
between  the  actual  split  factor  and  the  one  expected  by  the  market.  The  market 
expectation was calculated by simulating what the split factor should be so that the price 
reached after the last split was again reached with the current split. 
  Ikenberry  et  al.  (1996)  present  a  combination  of  the  trading  range  and  the 
signalling hypotheses. They believe these two are not mutually exclusive. If managers 
perceive a benefit for their shares to trade within a specific trading range and they also 
believe it is costly to trade below the lower limit of the interval, then managers will only 
decide to split if the price stays within the interval after the ex-date and if they also 
believe that the performance of the company will be good, at least to avoid a price drop 
                                                






below  the  relevant  threshold.  They  call  this  the  “self-selection  hypothesis”.  Their 
sample was comprised of 1,275 two-for-one splits from NYSE and ASE firms, for the 
period 1975-1990. The existence of short-term and long-term abnormal returns (they 
also found cumulative abnormal returns up to three years after the split), confirmed the 
authors’ idea that the split signals good information to the market that is not discredited 
in the following years. This in turn confirmed the reasoning behind the self-selection 
hypothesis, since managers seemed only to decide a split if they expected the price level 
after the split not to decrease to a level lower than the minimum relevant threshold. 
  In  brief, there  is no absolute consensus concerning the informational role  of 
splits,  but  the  evidence  presented  in  the  literature  points  to  investors believing  that 
managers  decide  splits  with  informational  intents.  Splitting  firms  are  normally 
associated  with  above  average  pre-split  operational  performance.  The  existence  of 
significant short and long-term positive abnormal returns amply documented leads to 
the conclusion that the information managers convey may have some validity that could 
justify such price behaviour. 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
  The former sections leave us with a few conclusions and some doubts. The main 
conclusion however, is that stock splits are an interesting phenomenon that is still far 
from completely understood.  
  There is almost an absolute consensus regarding short-term price effects induced 
by  splits.  The  evidence  presented  by  all  the  authors  surveyed  points  to  positive 
abnormal returns around splits announcements and/or ex-dates. The announcement date 
effect is usually more pronounced giving some credit to the hypotheses connected to the 
signalling argument. The long-term price effects were first found to be significant (in 
the first year following the announcement) but recent evidence has challenged this view. 
The  following  Figure  summarizes  much  of  the  literature  on  documented  abnormal 







Positive Abnormal Returns associated with Stock Splits – Available Evidence 
Short-term: 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) 
Maloney and Mulherin (1992) 
Ikenberry et al. (1996) 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) 
Desai and Jain (1997) 
Rankine and Stice (1997) 
Conroy and Harris (1999) 
Wulff (2002) 
Dennis and Strickland (2003) 
Long-term: 
Ikenberry et al. (1996) 
Desai and Jain (1997) 
(The  previous  works  have  been  challenged  by 
Boehme, 2001, and Byun and Rozeff, 2003) 
 
  In  terms  of  liquidity  there  is  still  quite  a  disagreement  especially  regarding 
volume. Different time frames may result in conflicting results. Where there seems to be 
an almost absolute consensus concerns the effects on relative or effective (%) spreads. 
The increase in spreads is a common feature in all the works surveyed. This cost is 
effectively supported by investors. The argument of a relative tick size, may, however, 
justify this because market participants have greater incentive to place orders correctly 
and hence avoid trading errors. The following figure condenses this literature. 
 
Figure 2 
Liquidity Changes associated with Stock Splits – Available Evidence 
Liquidity Increases: 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996) 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) 
Angel (1997) 
Schultz (2000) 
Dennis and Strickland (2003) 
Liquidity Decreases: 
Copeland (1979) 
Conroy et al. (1990) 
Desai et al. (1998) 
Guirao and Sala (2002) 
No Clear Evidence: 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) 
Maloney and Mulherin (1992) 




  There  also  seems  to  be  strong  evidence  supporting  the  idea  of  volatility 
increases. Both permanent and transient components have been found to increase. The 






which has received almost no attention in the literature is changes in systematic risk. 
This is one of the fields we will explore in our empirical analysis. 
  In many cases there seems to be evidence that signalling effects exist even if 
other elements, like dividend policy, may affect some of the results. In the case of splits 
history has been found to matter. Managers and markets play an interesting “game” in 
which each management board tries to convey the information it want to pass on, taking 
into consideration the previous experience of  the  company as well as intra-industry 
features and market wide prices. 
  The  self-selection  hypothesis  of  Ikenberry  et  al  (1996)  summarizes  in  an 
interesting way the contributions of the signalling and the liquidity literature. If there is 
an optimal trading range and there is a cost for trading below it, then managers will 
have a powerful incentive to split only if they truly believe in their company’s future. 
This theory may constitute an  important “rule of thumb” for managers to  take into 
account when deciding whether or not to split. 
3. Brief Historical Perspective 
 
  The Portuguese stock market experienced a considerable development during 
the late 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s. After being closed for a number of 
years,  following  the  April  25
th  1974  revolution,  it  reopened  in  1977  gaining  some 
additional visibility after Portugal’s entry to the EEC in 1986. 
  A large part of the 1990’s was a period of economic convergence towards the 
parameters of more developed countries, which in turn catalysed a significant increase 
in the Portuguese stock market index until 1999.  
  The bursting of the technology bubble, which  was most notorious on NASDAQ 
and the economies’ slip into recession made the period March 2000 – March 2003 one 
of the worse global bear markets ever recorded
10.  
  On January 1, 1999, the EURO (€) was introduced as the official currency of the 
11 starting members
11. The final exchange rates were fixed in December 31
st, 1998. On 
                                                
10 For additional information regarding the features and an historical perspective of the Portuguese Stock 
Market, see Sousa (2002). 
11 Greece joined on January 1







th, 1999 all stock exchanges in the Euro-zone started trading in euros. The 
main minimum tick size for all the exchanges was set at one euro cent. 
  As a consequence of the euro introduction all companies (listed or not) had to 
convert their capital into euros during the transitional period (until December 31
st 2001). 
In Portugal, almost all listed companies had their capital represented by shares worth a 
nominal (par) value of 1,000 PTE (Portuguese Escudos) each. 
  There  were  a  series  of  regulations  that  commanded  the  transitional  period. 
Among the most relevant, at the Union level, one can find Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97 
dated June 17, 1997 and Regulation (EC) No. 974/98 dated May 3,1998. At the national 
level, Decreto-lei No. 343/98 dated November 6, 1998, is probably the most important 
piece of legislation. The changes it introduced to Portuguese Corporate Law indirectly 
allowed listed firms to split their shares. The main Code of Corporate Law
12 in Portugal 
had to be adapted due to the Euro introduction (the changes were introduced by the 
above  mentioned  Decreto-lei).  Among  the  several  changes,  those  introduced  to  the 
original Article No. 276 where the most crucial. The original article stated: 
 
“Article No. 276 
(Nominal value of capital and shares) 
1.  The societies’ capital and shares must be expressed in a nominal value. 
2.  All shares must have the same nominal value (par value) that must not be lower than 1,000 
Escudos (PTE). 
3.  The minimum nominal value of capital for individual firms is 5,000,000 Escudos. 
4.  A share is indivisible.” 
 
  In  practice  it  was  almost  impossible  to  conduct  stock  splits,  because  most 
Portuguese companies had their capital divided into 1,000 PTE par value shares. As the 
article stated, each share had a minimum nominal value of 1,000 PTE and was legally 
indivisible. Decreto-lei No. 343/98, however, changed numbers 2 and 3 of the above 
article, putting the minimum value at one euro cent. 
  A similar phenomenon was reported by Wullf (2002) for Germany. He provides 
evidence that almost all traded shares in that market had a par value equivalent to the 
minimum just before several reforms documented. After each reform a large number of 
splits occurred, changing the par value to the new authorized minimum. 
                                                







4. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 
  The  present  study  covers  all  stock  splits  announced  and  executed  in  the 
Portuguese stock market from October 1999 to the end of June 2003. During this period 
26 stock splits were announced and executed
13. To identify the relevant operations and 
their  announcement  and  ex-dates  the  main  source  was  Dathis,  a  Euronext  Lisbon 
database. The announcement dates were crosschecked with information collected from 
the financial press. For the execution dates (ex-dates) the information was compared 
with  that from Bloomberg  (the  same  for  the  split factors applied).  Some additional 
information  released  by  the  companies  was  also  collected  from  this  source.  The 
CMVM’s
14 Internet site was used as an alternative source for information related to 
corporate actions involving splitting firms, during the relevant period. Dathis was also 
used as the source for the time series of splitting firms’ closing, bid and ask prices, as 
well as volume (number of shares and euro amount) and number of daily deals. 
  The following table shows the stock splits considered in the sample and their 
respective ex-dates and split factors (defined as the new number of shares for each old 
share)
15.  
                                                
13 An additional stock split was announced by Sumolis. The General Shareholders Meeting that approved 
the operation took place on June 27
th 2003, so the execution of the split took place after the end of our 
sample period. 
14 Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários – Portuguese financial markets’ watchdog. 
15 Of the sample firms, only one had a par value per share different from 1,000 PTE, before all the 
changes that resulted in the stock split. Its par value was 1,200 PTE (EUR 5.99). The par value of each 






Table 1 – Stock Splits, Ex-dates and Split Factors 
 
  It can be easily observed that the most commonly used split factor was five. 
With  the euro introduction the share  par value  for most  companies was 4.99  euros 
(1,000 PTE converted to euros). Prior to the split most companies conducted an increase 
in  their  nominal  capital  (converting  equity  reserves  or  retained  earnings  into  share 
capital) and hence each share increased its par value to exactly 5 euros. The use of a 
split factor of 5 thus resulted in a new par value for each share of 1 euro. 
  One striking feature of our sample is the relatively long time span between the 
announcement of the stock split and its actual execution. For the whole sample the mean 
time recorded between the tow events was approximately 246 days (214 days for the 
median). Even removing the sample’s clear outlier (Celulose do Caima) the mean and 
median values are still 214 and 205 days, respectively. This is in clear contrast with the 
time interval Conroy et al. (1990) report for their sample that is only an average of 51 
calendar days. A plausible explanation for the long time it took companies to undertake 
their  splits  is  the  requirement  that  the  General  Shareholders  Meeting  approves  the 
change in the shares’ par value, since changes to the firms’ charter rules have to be 






Brisa Priv 25-11-1999 5





Cort Amorim 08-11-2000 5




Modelo Continente 22-01-2001 5
Mota Engil 23-01-2001 5
Portucel 22-01-2001 5
Portugal Telecom 25-11-1999 5
SAG 23-05-2000 5
Salvador Caetano 25-09-2001 5
Semapa  14-09-2000 5
Sonae SGPS 21-06-2000 5
Teixeira Duarte 03-10-2000 12
Telecel 16-11-1999 10
V&A 29-05-2001 5
* this operation was very complex, involving an extraordinary dividend, 
a capital decrease followed by an increase and each old share was substituted






5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Liquidity Changes Around Stock Splits’ Ex-dates 
 
  As referred in section 2.2., improved liquidity has been one of the main reasons 
put forward by several authors to explain the reason why companies split their shares. In 
this section we use some of the most commonly proposed proxies to measure possible 
liquidity effects.  
  One of the main arguments in favour of an increased liquidity hypothesis after 
stock splits is the allegation that small investors may have a preference for lower priced 
stocks. This type of investor typically faces considerable restrictions in terms of the 
amount available to invest in each share. If round-lots are a rule in the stock exchange, 
than the small investor has two alternatives: either to 1) buy odd-lots incurring in higher 
costs and probably obtaining worse prices; or 2) buy only round-lots, restricting the 
number of stocks in his portfolio. Any of these solutions will result, however, in a less 
interesting portfolio (in terms of the corresponding risk/return combination) compared 
to that which the investor would achieve without significant financial restrictions.  
  In the Portuguese case, where there were no round-lot restrictions at the time of 
our sample, can we claim that small investors were severely restricted from investing as 
a consequence of very high share prices?  Prior to the split
16, the highest priced share in 
our sample was Telecel with a closing price of EUR 118.35. The minimum number of 
shares required for individual trades was one, implying that if a small investor wanted to 
invest in Telecel, the amount he had to put forward was just EUR 118.35 plus expenses, 
which does not seem to be a very restrictive amount. 
  Our null hypothesis on liquidity effects of stock splits is: 
 
H1: Stock splits have no liquidity effects around the respective ex-date. 
   
  If there are any signalling effects associated with splits, then it is likely that 
possible short-term abnormal returns should be more significant at the announcement 
date. Existing research confirms this view. Regarding liquidity effects the argument is 
                                                






precisely the opposite. Accordingly, Wulff (2002) uses a period around the ex-day to 
analyse liquidity effects. With the same objective in mind, Conroy et al (1990) and 
Guirao and Sala (2002) provide a comparison between the pre-announcement and the 
post-ex-date periods. 
  Another reason why we chose to study liquidity changes around the ex-date is 
the  relatively  high  time  span  between  the  announcement  and  the ex-date.  The  time 
frame considered in our analysis consists of a 45 trading days window before the stock 
split and 45 trading days after the split. To avoid contamination effects, the ex-date and 
ten trading days before and after the split were excluded from the sample. The window 
chosen is similar in length to that of Guirao and Sala (2002). Lamoureux and Poon 
(1987) use 60 trading days windows prior and after the announcement and ex-dates. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) compare 120 trading days windows (around the ex-
date), whereas Wulff (2002) uses 220 trading days windows.  
  Our analysis was conducted at two levels: individual stocks and the sample as a 
whole. The description of the variables used (pre and post-split) is as follows: 
 
-  Number of Days With Trades: the number of days the stock recorded trades, no 
matter the number of shares traded; 
-  No. of Trades: the total number of trades for the share, each trading day; 
-  No. of Shares Traded: the total number of shares traded during each trading day. 
The post-split number of shares is adjusted by the split-factor in order to be 
directly comparable with the pre-split period; 
-  Volume: the total euro volume of the trades recorded during each trading day. In 
this case there is no need to adjust the post-split period; 
-  Absolute Bid-Ask Spread: the closing bid-ask spread using euro prices for each 
trading day; 
-  Relative Bid-Ask Spread: the Absolute Bid-Ask spread divided by each trading 
day closing price. This is shown in percentage terms; 
-  Relative Volume: the Volume divided by the same trading day volume of the 
PSI 20 index. This is also presented as a percentage. 






  For the whole sample the results are first presented for the mean (the simple 
average of the 45 observations recorded for each period) of each variable. The resulting 
values  were  used  to  calculate  the  sample  mean  and  median  values.  To  test  for 
differences  between  the  pre  and  post-split  periods,  two  tests  were  conducted.  A 
parametric t test was used for differences in the mean and the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
test for differences in the median. The following table shows the results obtained
17. 
                                                






Table 2 – Liquidity Changes around Stock Splits Ex-dates – Whole Sample 
Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
BCP  45  45  276,9  570,0  313.197  809.160  7.800.525  22.520.987  0,027  0,016  0,107%  0,282% 
BPA  45  44  192,3  525,7  84.634  291.436  1.193.502  5.411.999  0,048  0,015  0,342%  0,415% 
BPI  45  45  326,6  591,7  244.227  334.983  4.612.037  6.799.984  0,075  0,020  0,397%  0,493% 
Brisa  45  45  449,5  1.443,6  116.688  318.057  4.286.072  12.429.301  0,143  0,033  0,391%  0,427% 
Brisa Priv  32  45  3,2  14,6  590  848  21.821  34.751  0,605  0,138  1,671%  1,622% 
Celulose Caima  27  18  1,6  1,4  170  68  4.301  1.851  1,465  0,323  5,717%  5,059% 
Cimpor  45  45  73,1  108,2  28.813  42.141  462.894  694.731  0,038  0,020  0,237%  0,535% 
CIN  43  45  13,7  442,9  8.245  47.523  201.928  1.678.107  0,426  0,050  1,762%  0,645% 
Cires  26  24  2,2  1,8  403  124  4.526  1.541  0,598  0,116  5,368%  4,199% 
Cofina  45  45  32,0  68,2  8.690  42.397  298.320  1.241.562  0,259  0,030  0,753%  1,180% 
Cort Amorim  45  45  38,2  106,2  18.089  114.945  158.940  643.454  0,055  0,014  0,632%  1,262% 
Colep  44  45  202,2  149,0  89.296  19.360  749.919  305.049  0,051  0,030  0,620%  1,045% 
EDP  45  45  930,1  951,1  938.218  422.788  17.850.144  7.692.448  0,050  0,011  0,261%  0,314% 
Finibanco  42  44  9,5  11,6  751  621  4.575  3.540  0,205  0,020  5,492%  1,699% 
Ibersol  45  45  15,4  43,8  3.157  3.021  140.430  123.239  1,534  0,032  5,632%  0,797% 
Modelo Continente  45  45  101,0  118,5  38.662  44.476  521.734  491.286  0,129  0,023  0,959%  1,076% 
Mota Engil  32  45  4,1  9,4  5.208  4.270  46.405  28.514  0,530  0,031  6,210%  2,227% 
Portucel  45  45  204,8  144,0  193.863  108.325  1.338.870  733.590  0,026  0,012  0,373%  0,802% 
Portugal Telecom  45  45  1.203,4  2.342,3  863.852  977.947  34.789.900  59.924.053  0,154  0,063  0,383%  0,574% 
SAG  45  45  150,4  161,6  63.399  56.253  857.276  728.461  0,066  0,020  0,518%  0,838% 
Salvador Caetano  8  31  0,6  3,0  21  257  201  3.472  0,761  0,199  7,489%  8,706% 
Semapa  45  45  82,8  89,1  49.448  26.220  990.664  506.350  0,154  0,036  0,817%  0,916% 
Sonae SGPS  45  45  868,0  589,3  293.089  372.483  13.880.200  3.330.977  0,144  0,065  0,306%  0,782% 
Teixeira Duarte  45  45  21,5  51,1  11.070  58.772  202.139  1.005.099  0,180  0,019  0,982%  1,394% 
Telecel  45  45  329,8  1.385,0  63.103  118.484  7.709.627  20.406.138  0,442  0,078  0,360%  0,472% 
V&A  39  43  6,1  9,2  879  954  5.261  3.745  0,243  0,030  3,795%  3,875% 
Mean  40,7  42,5  213,0  382,0  132.222  162.151  3.774.316  5.644.009  0,323  0,056  1,984%  1,601% 
Difference  1,8  169,0  29.929  1.869.693  -0,268  -0,382% 
t observed  1,506  2,408  0,962  1,361  -3,813  -1,302 
t critic (5%)  2,060  2,060  2,060  2,060  2,060  2,060 
p-value  0,1445  0,0238  0,3455  0,1857  0,0008  0,2049 
Median  45,0  45,0  78,0  113,4  33.737            46.000            492.314  711.596  0,154  0,030  0,692%  0,877% 
Wilcoxon Test 
Normalized Z observed  1,423  3,035  1,714  1,181  -4,457  0,902 
p-value  0,155  0,002  0,086  0,238  < 0,0001  0,367 
Mean Absolute Bid Ask  
Spread 
Mean Relative Bid-Ask  
Spread 
Number of  Days with  
Trades 
Mean No. of Trades 
Mean No. of Shares  
Traded 






  The results reported are not completely conclusive concerning liquidity changes. 
Most companies continuously traded within each of the two 45 trading days period 
(61.5%). In aggregate terms the mean number of trades increased slightly, but both the 
parametric and the non-parametric tests classify that change as non-significant (p-values 
of 0.1445 and 0.155 respectively). 
  The variable Number of Trades showed a visible increase. At the aggregate level 
from the pre-split to the post-split period the mean number of trades increased from 
213.0 to 382.0 trades per day per share, a 79.3% change. Even though more modest, the 
increase in the median is from 78.0 to 113.4 trades per day per share (a 45.4% increase). 
The  p-values  obtained  from  the  t  and  the  Wilcoxon  tests  (0.0028  and  0.002, 
respectively) show that there is a statistically significant increase in this variable. 
  Our sample of Portuguese stock splits also shows an increase in both the mean 
number of shares traded (post-split shares are adjusted by the split factor) and in the 
mean volume (measured in euros) but none of the tests recorded statistically significant 
changes (at conventional significance levels). In mean terms, the increase in the volume 
(euro) and number of shares traded was considerably lower than the increase in the 
number of trades
18.  
  We anticipated a decrease in the absolute bid-ask spread for two reasons: first, 
the work by Alves and Alves (2001) with a smaller sample documented such result; 
second, other markets where significant decreases have been documented, typically had 
smaller mean (and median) split factors
19. As expected, all sample firms had a decrease 
in their mean absolute bid-ask spread. The results obtained for the Relative Bid-Ask 
Spread were somewhat surprising. As reported in section 2.2, most literature reports an 
increase in the relative bid-ask spread thus supporting the argument that investors are 
left worse off as the result of larger transaction costs. The results in Table 2 show, 
however, that in aggregate terms the mean relative bid-ask spread actually decreases 
(from 1.984% to 1.601%). On the other hand, the median increases from 0.692% to 
0.877%. Parametric and non-parametric tests reveal, however, that these differences are 
not significant (p-values of 0.2049 and 0.367, respectively). We repeated our analysis 
                                                
18 In terms of the median the changes were not as dramatic, al though qualitatively similar. 
19 As described in section 1.3, the studies conducted concerning the U.S. market show the 2-for-1 splits as 
the most common. Some papers, for specific reasons, limit their sample to this type of splits, since it’s the 






but this time excluding those firms that had pre and/or post-split spreads above 3.5%. 
The results were quite different. We observed an increase in the mean relative bid-ask 
spread from 0.625% to 0.793%. This increase had a t statistic of 2.028, which is barely 
insignificant at the 5% level (p-value of 0.0577). As for the median, again an increase 
was recorded. The pre-split value was 0.397% and the post-split value was 0.782%. 
This increase was statistically significant (p-value of 0.0015). To further check these 
results a different approach was followed. The euro volume of each trading day for each 
firm was adjusted, dividing it by the trading volume for that day of the PSI 20 index. At 
least  a  part  of  the  liquidity  premium  can  be  viewed  in  relative  terms.  If  the  stock 
liquidity (euro volume traded) increases and that increase is higher than that of the 
market, this might be a more significant symptom of a liquidity improvement. Table 3 
shows the results. 
 






Brisa Priv 0,019% 0,012%










Modelo Continente 0,334% 0,413%
Mota Engil 0,011% 0,021%
Portucel 0,860% 0,594%
Portugal Telecom 31,978% 23,201%
SAG 0,355% 0,355%
Salvador Caetano 0,000% 0,003%
Semapa 0,639% 0,478%
Sonae SGPS 6,545% 2,136%


















  In terms of change signs, there is essentially a tie, as 13 go up and 13 go down. 
In aggregate terms there is a drop in the mean relative trading volume (in absolute terms 
there was an increase), but this drop is not significant (p-value of 0.3335). The median 
shows the contrary. The median relative volume traded goes from 0.345% to 0.446%, 
but this change also is not significant (p-value of 0.4047). 
  The results are in line with the mainstream literature in this issue. Our evidence 
is rather inconclusive regarding the influence of stock splits on liquidity. The only clear 
effect seems to be the increase in the number of trades, suggesting that, in line with 
Kryzanowsky and Zhang (1996) and Guirao and Sala (2002), small investors may have 
been attracted post-split. However, there is no significant impact on relative bid-ask 
spreads except for a sub-sample of firms, although the absolute spread was significantly 
reduced. At the same time, mean volume (in EUR) remained stable after the split. 
5.2 Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits’ Announcement and Ex-dates 
 
  This section analyses the price behavior around stock splits’ announcement and 
ex-dates. The null hypothesis that is tested is: 
 
H2: There are no price effects (i.e. no abnormal returns) around stock splits’ 
announcement and ex-dates. 
 
  Most studies find that abnormal returns are higher around the announcement 
date (for example: Lamoureux and Poon (1987); Maloney and Mulherin (1992)). The 
reason put forward to justify this is that stock splits provide a signal that is revealed at 
the announcement. However, the literature has also uncovered abnormal returns are also 
observable at the ex-date, albeit with a smaller magnitude than those recorded at the 
announcement date. The literature surveyed in section 2.2. typically attributes the ex-
date price effect to beneficial liquidity effects that investors can only capture after the 






  The PSI Geral Index was used as a proxy for the market return. This is a market-
weighted  index  of  the  Mercado  de  Cotações  Oficiais  of  Euronext  Lisbon
20.  Daily 














Ln R  
where Ln is the natural logarithm and Pi,t the price of stock or index i at day t. 
  To estimate price effects two methods were used:  
1)  The return of each share around the relevant date was compared with that of 
the market.    
t m t i t i R R NAR , , , - =   (2.1) 
NARi,t: Non-adjusted Abnormal Return on Stock i at day t; 
Ri,t: Return on Stock i at day t; 
Rm,t: Return on the Market Index at day t. 
 
2)  The  stock’s  return  was  compared  with  the  return  expected  for  that  day 
according to the market model. The market model was estimated according 
to the following equation: 
t i t m i i t i R R , , , e b a + + =     (2.2) 
Ri,t: Return on Stock i at day t; 
Rm,t: Return on the Market Index at day t; 
￿i,t: disturbance term with zero mean. 
The abnormal return estimated through this model is: 
( ) t m i i t i t i R R AR , , , ˆ ˆ b a + - =     (2.3) 
 
  The market model was estimated using daily returns for each stock and the PSI 
Geral Index. The 12 trading days prior to the announcement date and the ex-date were 
                                                
20 PSI 20 was not used because several of the companies in the sample were never index constituents. 
Alves and Alves (2001) used PSI 30 in their work. This choice was impossible to replicate in our work 






removed to avoid contamination effects
21. For each variable we used 245 trading days 
(244 daily returns), which represents approximately one year. 
  As seen in the previous section, many of the sample firms were thinly traded. In 
these cases the estimation procedure followed may not be the ideal (there are many 
blanks in the shares’ vector of daily returns). Escalda (1993) addresses this question 
specifically for the Portuguese stock market. Wulff (2002) also addressed this problem 
due to thin trading in many of his German sample firms. Dimson and Marsh (1983) 
proposed  an  alternative  estimation  procedure  that  produced  robust  results  for  their 
sample of U.K. firms. Their procedure uses the trade-to-trade return approach. This 
means that the returns used in their estimation are not daily returns, but returns between 
adjacent  stock  trades.  The  return  for  the  same  period  for  the  market  index  is  then 
calculated. The resulting returns (observations) are then weighted using the number of 


















, , + + = b
a
    (2.4) 
nt: number of days between adjacent trades; 
Ri,nt: Return on Stock i between two adjacent trades; 
Rm,nt: Return on the Market Index for the same period; 
ui,nt: disturbance term with zero mean. 
 
  The  abnormal  returns  are  estimated  according  to  a  similar  form  of equation 
(2.3), daily returns being substituted by the trade-to-trade returns, for both the stock and 
the market index. 
  To analyze the price effects we computed the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) for periods of 3 and 5 days centered in the announcement and ex-dates. The use 
of  CAR  is  common  in  event-study  methodology.  CAR  for firm  i  were  obtained as 
follows
23: 
                                                
21 Abnormal returns for each event were analysed using 3 or 5 days around the relevant dates. The 
purpose was to eliminate 10 trading days prior to the first day used to estimate abnormal returns. As a 
result of this, we eliminated 12 trading days prior to each event. 
22 See Dimson and Marsh (1983) and Wulff (2002). 













t i i AR CAR ,     (2.5) 
  Table 5 reports the results obtained for the sample using the standard market 
model to estimate abnormal returns. The t statistic computed is the one proposed by 
Brown and Warner (1985) to take into account cross-sectional correlation (due to event 
clustering,  which  seems  to  be  present  in  our  sample)
24.  There  are  other  proposals 
concerning the evaluation of the statistical significance of abnormal returns in event 
studies. For an overview of the main tests see Seiler (2000) and Serra (2002). 
                                                






Table 4 – Adjusted and Non-Adjusted Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
Announcement and Ex-dates  
 
   
3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days
BCP -1,172% -1,696% -0,525% -1,255% -1,216% -1,681% 0,715% -0,017%
t observed -0,517 -0,579 -0,136 -0,436 -0,538 -0,576 0,333 -0,006
BPA -2,041% -0,074% 10,296% 8,677% -2,078% -0,026% 10,264% 9,030%
t observed -0,330 -0,009 2,335 2,640 -0,336 -0,003 4,157 2,833
BPI 1,314% 1,192% -2,222% 0,547% 2,549% 2,230% -2,874% -0,734%
t observed 0,480 0,337 -0,443 0,146 0,964 0,653 -1,038 -0,205
Brisa 3,190% 4,160% -3,095% -6,512% 3,019% 3,315% -2,037% -5,646%
t observed 1,266 1,278 -0,764 -2,157 1,420 1,208 -0,916 -1,967
Brisa Priv 2,566% 3,772% -1,607% -2,514% 2,406% 2,770% 0,152% -1,088%
t observed 0,628 0,715 -0,214 -0,448 0,651 0,581 0,037 -0,203
Celulose Caima -0,325% 0,918% -1,040% 5,150% -0,230% 0,705% -1,009% 3,840%
t observed -0,077 0,168 -0,046 0,309 -0,056 0,133 -0,079 0,232
Cimpor -0,311% 0,379% 0,033% 0,036% -0,250% 1,258% 0,818% 1,044%
t observed -0,117 0,110 0,007 0,011 -0,105 0,409 0,366 0,362
CIN -5,110% -5,274% -1,770% 0,968% -4,220% -4,158% -0,689% 3,623%
t observed -1,232 -0,985 -0,253 0,186 -1,035 -0,790 -0,174 0,709
Cires 6,267% 9,695% - -2,723% 8,143% 10,692% - -1,191%
t observed 0,806 0,965 - -0,279 1,053 1,071 - -0,124
Cofina 6,881% 16,076% 1,596% 2,956% 8,530% 18,501% 1,448% 3,824%
t observed 1,231 2,228 0,133 0,331 1,565 2,629 0,214 0,437
Cort Amorim 4,123% 2,773% 4,642% 7,140% 3,896% 2,106% 3,898% 4,866%
t observed 1,473 0,767 0,943 1,946 1,703 0,713 1,669 1,613
Colep 0,734% 2,607% 3,421% 6,475% 0,895% 2,376% 3,826% 7,208%
t observed 0,218 0,599 0,536 1,362 0,269 0,553 1,098 1,602
EDP 2,265% 2,976% -0,723% -0,660% 2,312% 3,163% -0,220% -0,180%
t observed 0,951 0,968 -0,167 -0,205 0,987 1,046 -0,093 -0,059
Finibanco 2,482% 6,788% 1,934% 8,488% -0,662% 5,032% 2,572% 9,671%
t observed 0,624 1,322 0,403 2,371 -0,175 1,032 1,116 3,250
Ibersol -5,183% 2,205% -1,236% 0,752% -5,392% 0,841% -1,381% 1,003%
t observed -1,046 0,345 -0,174 0,142 -1,108 0,134 -0,343 0,193
Modelo Continente 0,027% 0,753% 2,415% 0,267% -0,921% -0,666% 2,314% 0,374%
t observed 0,010 0,218 0,446 0,066 -0,357 -0,200 0,743 0,093
Mota Engil -9,068% -3,428% -1,251% -1,835% -11,890% -4,782% -1,250% -1,844%
t observed -2,404 -0,704 -0,153 -0,301 -3,659 -1,140 -0,279 -0,319
Portucel 6,268% 5,166% 2,436% -0,509% 5,951% 5,491% 1,800% -0,485%
t observed 1,960 1,251 0,493 -0,138 1,904 1,361 0,669 -0,139
Portugal Telecom -8,756% -10,518% 2,995% 1,037% -9,190% -9,818% 2,722% 0,804%
t observed -2,977 -2,770 0,602 0,280 -3,257 -2,695 0,949 0,217
SAG 1,808% 0,204% 0,427% 1,198% 1,596% -0,028% -0,388% -0,319%
t observed 0,525 0,046 0,071 0,268 0,465 -0,006 -0,118 -0,075
Salvador Caetano 10,757% 12,678% - -7,521% 10,598% 12,290% - -12,284%
t observed 1,240 1,132 - -0,658 1,223 1,098 - -1,084
Semapa  -4,176% -5,514% -1,359% -3,522% -2,223% -2,998% -1,522% -4,382%
t observed -1,577 -1,613 -0,253 -0,879 -0,913 -0,954 -0,547 -1,219
Sonae SGPS -0,196% 0,016% -2,717% -3,786% -1,211% -0,516% -1,651% -1,898%
t observed -0,074 0,005 -0,480 -0,897 -0,464 -0,153 -0,527 -0,469
Teixeira Duarte 2,722% 4,810% 0,100% 2,585% -0,814% -0,516% -0,420% 0,941%
t observed 1,187 1,625 0,015 0,524 -0,586 -0,287 -0,131 0,227
Telecel 2,510% 2,365% 7,643% 7,694% 2,958% 2,999% 6,909% 6,502%
t observed 0,580 0,423 1,303 1,760 0,702 0,551 2,068 1,507
V&A -0,924% -1,911% 18,133% 22,922% 0,331% -0,018% 18,423% 23,350%
t observed -0,221 -0,354 2,123 3,600 0,086 -0,004 3,775 3,707
Average Ab. Return 2,764% 3,461% 6,753% 8,223% 3,076% 3,839% 9,967% 7,287%
Std Deviation 0,008 0,011 0,009 0,011 0,008 0,010 0,008 0,010
t observed 1,95 1,89 4,53 4,28 2,23 2,16 7,08 4,01
p-value 0,0517 0,0592 0,0000 0,0000 0,0257 0,0311 0,0000 0,0001
Non-Adjusted CumulativeAbnormal Returns Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns






  Our results show that cumulative abnormal returns at both the announcement (5-
day adjusted CAR of 3.8%) and ex-dates (5-day adjusted CAR of 7.3%) are statistically 
and economically very significant.  
  A rather surprising result is that abnormal returns are much higher around the 
execution  day  than  at  the  announcement  date  (both  for  adjusted  and  non-adjusted 
returns). Previous literature (e.g., Maloney and Mulherin, 1992) pointed to precisely the 
opposite result. 
  The statistical significance of our findings is quite high for the ex-date for both 
non-adjusted and adjusted abnormal returns. The results are also robust to the exclusion 
of the most obvious outliers from the sample. As for the announcement day, the results 
are  barely  insignificant  at  the  5%  level  (p-values  of  0.0517  and  0.0592)  using 
unadjusted returns. When adjusted returns are considered both measures of cumulative 
abnormal returns are significant at the 5% level. 
  To test the relation between CAR and liquidity two further regressions were 
estimated (not reported in tables). First, a regression was run having as an independent 
variable the relative (%) change in mean volume (euro) for each of the share in the 
sample. The dependent variable used was 5 days CAR for the ex-date
25. The results 
showed  that  the  significance  of  the  regression  was  low  (p-value  0.09396)  and  the 
parameter  associated  with  the  independent  variable  had  a  negative  sign  (against 
expectations). In a second experiment, the dependent variable was the same as before, 
but the independent variable was set up as the change in the relative bid-ask spread. The 
estimated  value  for  the  parameter  associated  with  the  independent  variable  had  a 
negative  sign  but  the  statistical  significance  of  the  regression  was  even  lower  than 
previous one (p-value 0.5860). 
  The following table replicates the above results using the alternative equation 
(2.4) to obtain the parameters used in the calculation of abnormal results. The non-
adjusted CAR are obviously equal under the two methods. For the firms that did not 
trade  daily  in  the  observation  period,  the  t  statistics  are  slightly  different.  This  is 
because the abnormal returns series is different from that of the market model. We used 
trade-to-trade returns for the market index and not the daily return as in the market 
                                                
25 We used this dependent variable for two reasons: first, since we are investigating changes in liquidity, it 
is more likely that these should occur around the ex-date; second,  we used 5 days instead of 3, because 






model results. This was in order to make direct comparisons between adjusted and non-







Table  5  –  Adjusted  and  Non-Adjusted  Abnormal  Returns  around  Stock  Splits 
Announcement and Ex-dates (using equation 2.4 alternative model)  
3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days
BCP -1,172% -1,696% -0,525% -1,255% -1,193% -1,641% 0,507% -0,224%
t observed -0,517 -0,579 -0,136 -0,436 -0,528 -0,562 0,236 -0,081
BPA -2,041% -0,074% 10,296% 8,677% -2,153% -0,069% 10,259% 9,080%
t observed -0,330 -0,009 2,335 2,640 -0,348 -0,009 4,152 2,847
BPI 1,314% 1,192% -2,222% 0,547% 2,572% 2,257% -3,002% -0,930%
t observed 0,480 0,337 -0,443 0,146 0,973 0,661 -1,084 -0,260
Brisa 3,190% 4,160% -3,095% -6,512% 3,047% 3,307% -1,988% -5,600%
t observed 1,266 1,278 -0,764 -2,157 1,432 1,204 -0,894 -1,951
Brisa Priv 2,566% 3,772% -1,607% -2,514% 2,387% 2,664% 0,067% -1,169%
t observed 0,609 0,693 -0,205 -0,431 0,649 0,561 0,016 -0,216
Celulose Caima -0,325% 0,918% -1,040% 5,150% -0,337% 0,623% -1,290% 5,104%
t observed -0,077 0,168 -0,044 0,295 -0,083 0,118 -0,096 0,294
Cimpor -0,311% 0,379% 0,033% 0,036% -0,215% 1,303% 0,834% 1,055%
t observed -0,117 0,110 0,007 0,011 -0,090 0,423 0,374 0,366
CIN -5,110% -5,274% -1,770% 0,968% -4,186% -4,124% -0,649% 3,684%
t observed -1,267 -1,013 -0,258 0,189 -1,056 -0,806 -0,167 0,733
Cires 6,267% 9,695% - -2,723% 8,582% 10,630% - -1,226%
t observed 0,750 0,899 - -0,264 1,105 1,060 - -0,127
Cofina 6,881% 16,076% 1,596% 2,956% 8,355% 18,278% 1,502% 3,970%
t observed 1,232 2,229 0,133 0,331 1,533 2,598 0,222 0,454
Cort Amorim 4,123% 2,773% 4,642% 7,140% 3,899% 2,084% 3,871% 4,757%
t observed 1,473 0,767 0,943 1,946 1,703 0,705 1,656 1,576
Colep 0,734% 2,607% 3,421% 6,475% 0,954% 2,472% 3,851% 7,231%
t observed 0,218 0,599 0,536 1,362 0,286 0,575 1,104 1,606
EDP 2,265% 2,976% -0,723% -0,660% 2,331% 3,197% -0,198% -0,159%
t observed 0,951 0,968 -0,167 -0,205 0,995 1,057 -0,083 -0,052
Finibanco 2,482% 6,788% 1,934% 8,488% -0,820% 4,940% 2,560% 9,670%
t observed 0,633 1,341 0,397 2,341 -0,220 1,029 1,103 3,228
Ibersol -5,183% 2,205% -1,236% 0,752% -5,227% 1,222% -1,321% 1,018%
t observed -1,043 0,344 -0,174 0,142 -1,073 0,194 -0,328 0,196
Modelo Continente 0,027% 0,753% 2,415% 0,267% -0,880% -0,609% 2,230% 0,342%
t observed 0,010 0,218 0,446 0,066 -0,341 -0,183 0,716 0,085
Mota Engil -9,068% -3,428% -1,251% -1,835% -11,730% -4,749% -1,376% -1,969%
t observed -2,423 -0,710 -0,153 -0,301 -3,619 -1,135 -0,308 -0,342
Portucel 6,268% 5,166% 2,436% -0,509% 5,865% 5,486% 1,860% -0,416%
t observed 1,960 1,251 0,493 -0,138 1,876 1,359 0,691 -0,120
Portugal Telecom -8,756% -10,518% 2,995% 1,037% -9,251% -9,738% 2,628% 0,726%
t observed -2,977 -2,770 0,602 0,280 -3,276 -2,671 0,916 0,196
SAG 1,808% 0,204% 0,427% 1,198% 1,601% -0,014% -0,472% -0,443%
t observed 0,525 0,046 0,071 0,268 0,466 -0,003 -0,144 -0,105
Salvador Caetano 10,757% 12,678% - -7,521% 10,032% 11,277% - -9,831%
t observed 1,222 1,115 - -0,677 1,149 1,000 - -0,888
Semapa  -4,176% -5,514% -1,359% -3,522% -2,276% -3,066% -1,581% -4,496%
t observed -1,577 -1,613 -0,253 -0,879 -0,935 -0,976 -0,567 -1,250
Sonae SGPS -0,196% 0,016% -2,717% -3,786% -1,163% -0,471% -1,672% -1,947%
t observed -0,074 0,005 -0,480 -0,897 -0,445 -0,140 -0,534 -0,482
Teixeira Duarte 2,722% 4,810% 0,100% 2,585% -1,403% -1,395% -0,445% 0,907%
t observed 1,172 1,605 0,015 0,522 -1,026 -0,790 -0,139 0,219
Telecel 2,510% 2,365% 7,643% 7,694% 2,920% 2,930% 6,968% 6,578%
t observed 0,580 0,423 1,303 1,760 0,692 0,538 2,085 1,525
V&A -0,924% -1,911% 18,133% 22,922% 0,541% 0,298% 19,068% 23,970%
t observed -0,215 -0,344 2,094 3,552 0,139 0,059 3,881 3,779
Average Ab. Return 2,764% 3,461% 6,753% 8,223% 3,016% 3,736% 10,030% 7,488%
Std Deviation 0,008 0,011 0,009 0,011 0,008 0,010 0,008 0,011
t observed 1,95 1,89 4,47 4,21 2,19 2,10 7,09 4,10
p-value 0,0516 0,0591 0,0000 0,0000 0,0283 0,0353 0,0000 0,0000
Non-Adjusted CumulativeAbnormal Returns Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns






  From the table above one can observe that there are no major differences, at the 
aggregate level, between the results presented in this table and those of table 4. The 
CAR  for  the  announcement  date  under  the  trade-to-trade  approach  are  marginally 
smaller  than  those  obtained  under  the  market  model  (for  both  3  and  5  days).  The 
opposite occurs for the ex-date. In terms of statistical significance the magnitude of the 
p-value barely changes. 
  Lease et al. (1991), in the case of seasoned equity offerings, and Maloney and 
Mulherin  (1992),  in  the  case  of  stock  splits,  have  found  evidence  that  market 
microstructure  features  are  a  potential  explanation  for  the  observed  abnormal  price 
effects associated with those phenomenon. Around the relevant dates the closing price 
tends to approach the bid (in the first case) or the ask prices (in the second). In the 
context  of  stock  splits,  prices  tend  to  be  more  clustered  around  the  last  ask  price 
compared to a “normal” situation. In light of this they claim that probably the gain most 
authors  calculate  in  terms  of  abnormal  returns  cannot  in  practice  be  captured  by 
investors. To further test this hypothesis they analysed the existence of abnormal returns 
using bid instead of closing prices. 
  We  replicated  the  above  procedure  in  our  work.  Last  bid  prices  were  used 
(instead of closing ones) to estimate cumulative abnormal returns around stock splits’ 
announcement and ex-dates. For consistency purposes, the market model and the trade-
to-trade approach were again estimated using bid prices. The following table shows the 
results according to the market model
26. 
                                                
26 See Annex 1 for the table with the results obtained using the trade-to trade approach. Results are very 






Table 6 – Adjusted and Non-Adjusted Abnormal Returns Around Stock Splits 
Announcement and Ex-dates (using Last Bid Prices) 
 
3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days
BCP -1,249% -1,403% -1,338% -2,178% -1,293% -1,404% -0,097% -0,938%
t observed -0,550 -0,478 -0,345 -0,753 -0,570 -0,480 -0,045 -0,336
BPA -1,692% 0,559% 9,726% 8,890% -1,736% 0,648% 9,706% 9,208%
t observed -0,281 0,072 2,405 2,949 -0,289 0,084 4,273 3,140
BPI 1,218% 2,162% -2,422% 0,936% 2,336% 3,103% -2,946% -0,102%
t observed 0,434 0,596 -0,463 0,240 0,854 0,879 -1,001 -0,027
Brisa 3,456% 4,165% -3,360% -6,303% 3,294% 3,370% -2,385% -5,503%
t observed 1,438 1,342 -0,831 -2,092 1,615 1,280 -1,066 -1,905
Brisa Priv 0,425% 1,867% -0,956% -2,940% 0,210% 0,556% 0,805% -1,515%
t observed 0,113 0,383 -0,162 -0,667 0,068 0,140 0,254 -0,371
Celulose Caima 1,187% 2,804% -1,040% -2,212% 1,298% 2,603% -2,051% -0,588%
t observed 0,278 0,509 -0,068 -0,193 0,316 0,490 -0,235 -0,052
Cimpor -0,311% 0,379% -0,821% 0,344% -0,250% 1,258% 0,028% 1,432%
t observed -0,117 0,110 -0,184 0,104 -0,105 0,409 0,013 0,508
CIN -3,649% -6,564% -0,358% 0,968% -2,597% -5,230% 0,969% 4,341%
t observed -0,880 -1,227 -0,054 0,196 -0,643 -1,003 0,264 0,915
Cires 17,507% 9,610% -7,353% -6,734% 19,124% 10,454% -7,470% -6,734%
t observed 3,198 1,360 -0,738 -0,906 3,536 1,497 -1,346 -0,940
Cofina 6,881% 15,847% 1,628% 1,843% 8,098% 17,648% 1,524% 2,881%
t observed 1,386 2,473 0,135 0,204 1,661 2,803 0,223 0,327
Cort Amorim 4,123% 4,298% 4,663% 5,949% 3,893% 3,626% 3,920% 3,670%
t observed 1,593 1,287 1,042 1,784 1,929 1,392 1,952 1,415
Colep 1,281% 0,595% 3,623% 6,475% 1,459% 0,570% 3,962% 7,098%
t observed 0,419 0,151 0,593 1,421 0,479 0,145 1,174 1,629
EDP 2,056% 3,306% -1,001% -0,938% 2,104% 3,499% -0,497% -0,457%
t observed 0,892 1,111 -0,240 -0,302 0,930 1,198 -0,218 -0,155
Finibanco 4,432% 4,258% 0,952% 4,735% 1,632% 2,698% 1,492% 5,743%
t observed 1,172 0,872 0,208 1,387 0,451 0,578 0,653 1,948
Ibersol -6,473% 0,463% -4,562% -0,426% -6,591% -0,549% -4,694% -0,187%
t observed -1,365 0,076 -0,647 -0,081 -1,407 -0,091 -1,173 -0,036
Modelo Continente 0,027% -0,290% 2,056% 0,267% -1,047% -1,893% 1,781% 0,390%
t observed 0,010 -0,085 0,399 0,070 -0,413 -0,579 0,609 0,103
Mota Engil -4,762% -3,650% -1,281% -4,195% -7,468% -4,934% -1,266% -4,191%
t observed -1,056 -0,627 -0,137 -0,604 -1,815 -0,929 -0,247 -0,633
Portucel 7,341% 4,787% 1,749% -0,370% 7,015% 5,130% 1,094% -0,345%
t observed 2,403 1,214 0,379 -0,108 2,360 1,337 0,441 -0,108
Portugal Telecom -9,088% -10,981% 2,995% 0,828% -9,569% -10,217% 2,631% 0,522%
t observed -2,987 -2,795 0,610 0,227 -3,296 -2,726 0,931 0,143
SAG 1,352% 0,279% -0,080% 0,862% 1,086% -0,017% -0,958% -0,764%
t observed 0,446 0,071 -0,014 0,201 0,362 -0,004 -0,308 -0,191
Salvador Caetano 2,075% 4,073% -15,096% -12,000% 0,592% 1,128% -11,182% -6,983%
t observed 0,435 0,661 -1,854 -1,977 0,131 0,193 -2,444 -1,182
Semapa  -4,176% -4,760% -1,359% -3,572% -2,080% -2,058% -1,516% -4,437%
t observed -1,646 -1,453 -0,278 -0,979 -0,914 -0,701 -0,617 -1,398
Sonae SGPS 0,312% -0,026% -2,717% -3,311% -0,771% -0,591% -1,610% -1,349%
t observed 0,116 -0,007 -0,474 -0,774 -0,293 -0,174 -0,509 -0,330
Teixeira Duarte 3,596% -0,612% 0,095% 3,349% -0,795% -7,208% -0,445% 1,637%
t observed 1,215 -0,160 0,013 0,623 -0,358 -2,515 -0,125 0,357
Telecel 2,516% 2,365% 7,248% 7,996% 2,736% 2,696% 6,692% 7,083%
t observed 0,581 0,423 1,257 1,861 0,638 0,487 2,028 1,662
V&A -1,600% -0,279% 7,986% 28,539% -0,221% 1,803% 8,225% 29,037%
t observed -0,413 -0,056 1,133 5,430 -0,064 0,403 2,132 5,829
Average Ab. Return 3,145% 2,800% 4,619% 7,885% 3,121% 2,792% 7,722% 7,599%
Std Deviation 0,007 0,010 0,008 0,011 0,007 0,009 0,008 0,010
t observed 2,42 1,67 3,20 4,23 2,51 1,74 5,77 4,40
p-value 0,0153 0,0946 0,0014 0,0000 0,0122 0,0823 0,0000 0,0000
Non-Adjusted CumulativeAbnormal Returns Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns







  Table  6  reveals  that  the  use  of  last  bid,  instead  of  closing,  prices  has some 
consequences. Concerning the announcement date there is an opposite behavior for 3 
and 5 days CAR (for both unadjusted and adjusted) than the one documented earlier. 
The estimated CAR for 3 days increases and so does the test statistic while the opposite 
occurs for the 5 days CAR. It can now be observed that the 3 days CAR are significant 
at the 5% level for unadjusted and adjusted abnormal returns (p-values of 0.0153 and 
0.0122) while for 5 days CAR the statistical significance has been diminished (0.0946 
and 0.0823). 
  Regarding the ex-date, the 3 days CAR abnormal returns are clearly smaller 
using last bid prices. There is a strong impact in the test statistic, but the statistical 
significance is still quite high (p-values of 0.0000). In terms of the 5 days CAR, the 
conclusions are not so clear. There is an increase using adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns and a decrease using the unadjusted version. 
  Even though not absolutely clear cut, it seems that around the ex-date closing 
prices tend to drift towards the ask price. The resulting consequence is that abnormal 
returns using closing prices may be somewhat overestimated. Thus, a relatively small 
part of the gains may not be earnable by investors. As to the announcement date the 
results are more conflicting. 
  To summarize, our evidence for the Portuguese market is consistent with stock 
splits  leading  to  a  significant  positive  price  effects  at  either  the  announcement  or 
execution dates. These price effects do not seem to be attributable to the microstructure 
market features mentioned by Maloney and Mulherin (1992). Finally, our evidence does 
not show the occurrence of relevant liquidity changes that could explain those abnormal 
returns. 
5.3 Changes in Systematic Risk 
 
  If systematic risk changes, in other words, if the stock Beta (estimated according 
to a market model) changes, then the stock price should adjust to take into account this 






the positive abnormal returns associated to part of his sample of stock splits could be 
explained by ex-post reductions in systematic risk . 
  Since  managers  have  greater  insight  over  the  company’s  prospects,  this 
argument  suggests  that  through  stock  splits  they  may  be  trying  to  signal  that  the 
company’s systematic risk is falling. 
  To evaluate the post-split changes in systematic risk, we estimated the stock’s 
beta. We only used the market model - equation (2.2) - using the closing price of each 
day. The time frame used was similar to the one presented earlier, that is, 12 trading 
days after the ex-date, 245 daily trading days for the market index (PSI Geral) and each 
stock
27.  
  Our null hypothesis on systematic risk changes is therefore:  
 
H3: Stock splits are not associated with changes in the stock’s systematic risk, 
measured by the stock’s market model Beta. 
 
  To test this hypothesis we compared the pre-announcement and post-split betas. 
Table 7 shows the results. 
                                                
27 One observation (Cimpor) was excluded due to lack of sufficient data. For BPA the time frame used 






Table 7 – Beta Changes After Stock Splits 
 
 
  The tests reported in the table above show no significant difference between pre- 
and  post-split  Betas.  The  p-values  obtained  for  both  tests  were  high,  so  the  null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. 
  We  continued  our  analysis  by  inquiring  whether  the  evidence  supported  the 
rejection of the additional null hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is no relation between Beta changes and individual CAR. 
 
To test this hypothesis the following regression was estimated: 
 







Brisa Priv 0,416 0,213









Modelo Continente 0,651 1,017
Mota Engil 0,082 0,262
Portucel 0,618 0,605
Portugal Telecom 1,289 2,139
SAG 0,870 0,536
Salvador Caetano 0,881 1,100
Semapa  0,399 0,668
Sonae SGPS 1,303 1,667





t statistic observed 0,480
p-value 0,6357
Median 0,618 0,527







CARi: 5 days Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Stock i, around 
the announcement date
28; 
￿MM￿i:  Difference  between  post-split  beta  and  pre-announcement  beta, 
using the market model. 
 
  Our  regression  results  do  not  provide  evidence  to  reject  H4.  The  p-value 
associated with the explanatory variable was 0.6934, while the sign associated with the 
explanatory variable was positive (contrary to what could be expected). 
5.4 Changes in EPS Growth Rates 
 
  Lakonishok  and  Lev  (1987)  show  that  stock  splitters  exhibit  a  pre-
announcement period characterized by higher earnings growth than a group of control 
firms. This agrees with the argument that splits may be seen as a sign from management 
that “good times” are to last. The self-selection hypothesis of Ikenberry et al. (1996) 
described in section 2.2. also considers this possibility. 
  If  Portuguese managers  believe  that the  earnings  growth of their  firms is to 
continue or improve, then they could use splits to communicate to the market their 
conviction
29. 
  To obtain the EPS (Earnings Per Share) data series, we used Bloomberg. With 
this data we calculated growth rates for the year prior to the announcement. The EPS 
growth rates were then computed for the year following the ex-date (if the ex-date was 
in the second semester; if this was in the first semester, the EPS growth rate was that of 
the year in which the execution occurred).  
  Our null hypothesis was the following: 
 
H5: Stock Splits do not signal any change in the growth rate of annual (split-
adjusted) EPS. 
                                                
28 Even though the cumulative abnormal returns estimated were higher at the ex-date, it is nonetheless 
reasonable to expect that if there are signalling effects these should occur at the announcement date. 
29 As described in the following paragraph actual pre and post-split EPS growth rates were used. This 
may not be entirely correct. One should probably use the change in expected post-split results to analyse 
the information transmitted through splits. The procedure used, however, is similar to that followed by 






  To test H5 a regression was run with the change between the annual EPS growth 
rates  (calculated  as  described  above)  as  the  explanatory  variable.  The  dependent 
variable was again the 5 days adjusted CAR for the announcement date. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected this would be consistent with stock splits being signaling vehicles 
regarding future EPS growth. If the relation is positive, then the market would correctly 
identify “good” firms as those with higher abnormal returns around the announcement 
date. 
  The regression model used here was: 
 
( ) i i i EPS CAR e b a + D + =  
CARi: 5 days Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Stock i, around 
the announcement date; 
￿EPSi:  Difference  between  post-split  EPS  Growth  Rate  and  pre-
announcement EPS Growth Rate, as described above. 
 
  Our results could not reject H5
30. The estimated value for ￿ was –0.0116. The 
sign for this estimate was thus the opposite of what could be expected. The statistical 
significance for the explanatory variable was quite low. The associated p-value was 
0.3660 while the regression R-squared was only 0.0410. The results, therefore, show no 
support for stock splits signaling future changes in EPS growth rates of splitting firms. 
 
5.5 Price Run-Up of Stock Splitting Firms 
   
As  mentioned  in  section  2,  some  evidence  is  consistent  with  splitting  firms 
enjoying a period of rapid (relative and absolute) stock price appreciation in the pre-
announcement period. For instance, Ikenberry et al. (1996) present evidence consistent 
with this assertion, although claiming that managers’ decision is conditional on their 
expectations regarding the firms’ future performance
31. They also find an extremely 
                                                
30 Three splits were removed from the sample: the second class of Brisa’s shares; Cimpor because the 
stock split only took place during 2003; and BPA due to the fact that its delisting occurred before the 
post-split EPS Growth Rate could be computed. 






favourable relative performance of splitting firms versus the S&P 500 index. Maloney 
and Mulherin (1992) also confirm an abnormal good performance for splitting firms. 
  If  splitting  firms  in  our  sample  have  experienced  a  period  of  absolute  (and 
relative) good performance, then this could influence the decision to split shares. If the 
Ikenberry  et al’s  (1996)  “self-selection  hypothesis”  is  valid,  then  the  split could  be 
interpreted as a signal from the manager about the future performance of the firm. 
  The analysis of the firm’s price  performance was  made in relative terms by 
comparing it with the performance of the PSI Geral Index. The comparison period was 
comprised of one year leading up to the announcement date. Table 8 shows the results: 
 
Table 8 – Price Run-Up of Splitting Firms Vs PSI Geral 
 
  In aggregate terms, the sample shows an increase in mean stock prices in the 
year leading up to the announcement
32. However, this increase is lower than the one 
experienced by the market index. In median terms the picture is even more striking: 
                                                
32 Maloney and Mulherin (1992) also report an increase in absolute prices prior to the stock split. 
Index Stock Difference
BCP 6,05% 15,67% 9,61%
BPA 10,32% 18,46% 8,14%
BPI -14,72% -19,19% -4,47%
Brisa 0,68% 9,11% 8,43%
Brisa Priv 0,68% 1,76% 1,08%
Celulose Caima 10,82% -2,33% -13,15%
Cimpor -21,40% -18,53% 2,87%
CIN -0,79% -30,48% -29,69%
Cires 28,36% -16,41% -44,78%
Cofina 29,91% 176,19% 146,29%
Cort Amorim 25,19% -13,97% -39,15%
Colep -20,05% -51,00% -30,95%
EDP 27,39% 8,44% -18,95%
Finibanco 24,87% -1,92% -26,79%
Ibersol 47,22% -13,86% -61,07%
Modelo Continente 18,72% -6,17% -24,90%
Mota Engil 17,10% -0,31% -17,41%
Portucel 36,42% 53,76% 17,34%
Portugal Telecom -10,38% -31,12% -20,74%
SAG 14,20% 32,89% 18,68%
Salvador Caetano -25,59% -23,42% 2,17%
Semapa  30,24% 14,46% -15,79%
Sonae SGPS 28,36% 66,16% 37,80%
Teixeira Duarte 27,86% 42,02% 14,17%
Telecel -2,78% 32,06% 34,84%
V&A -0,14% -16,60% -16,46%
Mean 11,10% 8,68%











splitting  firms  show  a  small  price  decrease  while  the  index  shows  an  even  higher 
increase.  Two-tailed  parametric  and  non-parametric  tests  show  that  there  is  no 
statistically  significant  difference  between  the  paired  samples.  Unreported  market-
adjusted returns also reveal no significant price run-up of splitting firms prior to the 
split announcement. 
  One  can  therefore conclude  that,  unlike  prior  research  in  other  markets,  our 
evidence does not support the existence of significant stock price appreciation before 
the split. 
5.6 International Comparison of Market Prices and Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
  Angel  (1997)  collected information  on  the  mean  and  median  price  levels  of 
stocks around the world (in home currency and USD terms), observing that these vary 
considerably  across  markets.  A  question  that  could  be  raised  is  whether  the  euro 
introduction would lead to more homogenous mean prices in Eurozone countries. A 
possible reason for this could be the minimum tick size. In Euronext Lisbon the rule is 
for minimum tick sizes to vary according to share prices in the following way
33: 
 
From EUR 0 to EUR 50 – EUR 0.01; 
From EUR 50 to EUR 100 – EUR 0.05; 
From EUR 100 to EUR 500 – EUR 0.10; 
Above EUR 500 – EUR 0.50. 
   
  These same rules are applied in the other three Euronext markets (Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Paris). For Spain, Guirao and Sala (2002) observe that this is also the rule 
for stocks priced at less than EUR 50 and 5 euro cents for stocks priced above this 
threshold. In Germany, the exchange rules state a single minimum tick size of EUR 
0.01. In Italy there are five possible minimum tick sizes. For stocks priced between 
EUR 3.00 and EUR 30, the minimum tick is EUR 0.01. For stocks trading above EUR 
30.00, the minimum tick is EUR 0.05. For all the exchanges mentioned the minimum 
                                                






round lot is 1.  The  great  similarity  of  minimum  tick  sizes  reported  here  is  in  clear 
contrast to that reported by Angel (1997)
34.  
  With the similar (or equal) rules for the exchanges mentioned shouldn’t prices 
converge towards the same value? If Portuguese firm’s managers believe that the share 
price of their firms should be aligned with those of firms listed in other markets (namely 
in the Eurozone), stock splits could serve that purpose. 
  To investigate this hypothesis further we collected from Bloomberg data on the 
price of stocks pertaining to each of the exchanges mentioned. The date chosen was 
Monday,  June  30,  2003.  For  each  exchange  the  companies  selected  were  the 
constituents of the most relevant local stock index. The relevant indexes chosen were: 
for Spain (Madrid) IBEX 35, for France (Paris) CAC 40, for Germany (Frankfurt) DAX 
30, for the Netherlands (Amsterdam) AEX 25, for Belgium (Brussels) BEL 20, for Italy 
(Milan) MIB 30 and for Portugal (Lisbon) PSI 20. 
  The following table summarizes the findings regarding mean prices, standard 
deviation and median prices. 
 
Table 9 – Mean and Median Price Levels for Indexes Constituents  
 
  The  Portuguese  stock  market  clearly  exhibits  the  lowest  price  level  for  the 
exchanges considered. These differences were computed against Euronext Ex-Portugal 
and All Ex-Portugal. The two-tailed parametric t test and the non-parametric tests
35 
conducted all lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of mean/median equality. The 
p-values associated with the various tests were always less than 0.0001. 
  This  finding  therefore  doesn’t  confirm  the  view  that  Portuguese  managers 
conducted their stock splits in order to approximate the price level of the internationally 
                                                
34 His data reports to 1994. 
35 The non-parametric tests conducted were Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney’s U. 





Mean Price 3,9255 40,3077 19,5310 51,0740 16,1706 7,2563 36,3237 36,8500 27,7585
Standard Deviation 3,9848 30,4033 20,0488 49,3436 10,8041 5,7934 24,6454 34,9718 29,0797






prevalent  price  since  splits  apparently  increased  the  price  distance  to  international 
benchmarks
36.  
  In an additional analysis, for the same index constituents as above, data was 
collected regarding closing, last bid and ask prices, as of June, 2003. The resulting daily 
market wide relative bid-ask spreads for the PSI 20 were then compared to those of 
Euronext Ex-Portugal and All Ex-Portugal. The following table shows the daily mean 
and median relative bid-ask spreads for each of the groups: 
 
Table 10 – Mean and Median Daily Relative Bid-Ask Spreads (June 2003)  
 
   
  For the whole month the mean of mean daily relative bid-ask spread is 1.082%, 
while  it’s  0.272%  for  Euronext  Ex-Portugal  and  0.275%  for  All  Ex-Portugal.  The 
parametric test undertaken to test these mean differences resulted, for both cases, in a p-
value smaller than 0.0001, thus leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis of mean 
equality. 
 
5.7 Survey on the Motivations of Stock Splitting Firms 
 
                                                
36 There is, however, a potential limitation in drawing this conclusion: the PSI 20 does not coincide with 
our sample of splitting firms. Nonetheless, the splitting firms are well represented in the index, since 13 
out of the 20 firms in the index have split, thus giving some comfort to our conclusions. 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
02-06-2003 0,93% 0,61% 0,26% 0,19% 0,26% 0,20%
03-06-2003 1,11% 0,72% 0,27% 0,18% 0,30% 0,21%
04-06-2003 1,03% 0,59% 0,20% 0,09% 0,21% 0,14%
05-06-2003 1,14% 0,75% 0,25% 0,15% 0,26% 0,19%
06-06-2003 1,29% 0,63% 0,31% 0,19% 0,31% 0,19%
09-06-2003 1,01% 0,76% 0,33% 0,22% 0,31% 0,20%
10-06-2003 1,11% 0,79% 0,29% 0,18% 0,27% 0,18%
11-06-2003 0,96% 0,70% 0,33% 0,19% 0,29% 0,19%
12-06-2003 1,01% 0,50% 0,28% 0,17% 0,27% 0,17%
13-06-2003 0,98% 0,77% 0,27% 0,18% 0,30% 0,25%
16-06-2003 1,10% 0,73% 0,26% 0,19% 0,27% 0,21%
17-06-2003 1,14% 0,88% 0,25% 0,15% 0,31% 0,17%
18-06-2003 1,08% 0,76% 0,23% 0,09% 0,24% 0,17%
19-06-2003 1,28% 0,80% 0,26% 0,14% 0,26% 0,16%
20-06-2003 1,07% 0,80% 0,23% 0,12% 0,33% 0,19%
23-06-2003 1,16% 0,70% 0,24% 0,13% 0,27% 0,19%
24-06-2003 1,10% 0,80% 0,27% 0,17% 0,26% 0,19%
25-06-2003 1,00% 0,62% 0,28% 0,17% 0,27% 0,20%
26-06-2003 0,96% 0,67% 0,31% 0,20% 0,27% 0,19%
27-06-2003 0,91% 0,68% 0,28% 0,18% 0,26% 0,18%
30-06-2003 1,35% 0,74% 0,30% 0,16% 0,27% 0,17%






  In this section of our empirical work we tried to unveil managers’ intentions 
when executing stock splits. To achieve this goal, a survey was prepared and sent to the 
Investor  Relations  Department  of  the  splitting  firms.  The  original  Portuguese  and 
English versions may be found in the Annexes. Alongside the questionnaire a letter was 
sent explaining the purpose of the research. 
  The  questionnaire  was sent  in  mid  April  2003  to  the  sample firms  that  still 
existed as autonomous legal entities
37. This resulted in 23 questionnaires. At the end, 
eight  responses  were  received.  For  confidentiality  reasons,  the  names  of  those  that 
responded  are  not  disclosed  (this  is  why  the  following  tables  shown  have  the 
companies’ names substituted by C1 to C8). Firms were asked a total of ten questions 
and told to rate, for questions 2, 5, 8 and 10, in a scale going from 0 (unimportant) to 5 
(very  important)  a  number  of  possible  responses
38.  The  remaining  questions  had  a 
qualitative nature. 
  The first question asked firms the time length between the decision to do the 
split and its announcement. Seven companies responded. Among these, three reported a 
period larger than 3 months, three reported a period between 1 and 3 months and one 
reported a period between 15 days and one month. This relatively long time frame, 
added to the long time span between the announcement and execution dates confirm the 
validity of some choices made in the empirical analyses reported in earlier sections. 
  Question 2 asked firms their views on the objectives of the split operation. Table 
11 reports the answers received: 
 
Table 11 – Answers to Question 2 of the Questionnaire 
Objectives of the Split Operation 
(0=unimportant; 5=very important) 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 Mean
a) Liquidity increases 5 5 0 4 4 5 5 2 3,750
b) Increase in the number of shareholders 1 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 2,875
c) Create wealth for shareholders 1 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 1,250
d) Place the price closer to an "ideal" value, lower than the previous 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,125
e) Signal confidence 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0,375
f) Structure simplification (e.g., 1 EUR per share) 5 3 5 3 5 0 4 5 3,750
g) Allow a more favourable price evolution 5 1 0 3 2 4 0 0 1,875
h) Facilitate changes in dividend policy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,125
i) Other reasons (specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,000  
 
                                                
37 This left out BPA and Colep. 






  Companies placed “Liquidity increases” and “Structure simplification” at the top 
of the list with a mean value of 3.75
39. The “Increase in the number of shareholders” 
had a mean score of 2.875.  To “Allow a more favorable price evolution” had a 1.875 
mean score. Finally, “Create wealth for shareholders” recorded a 1.250 mean score.  
  These results suggest that liquidity increases and structure simplification seem to 
be the most important determinants from the firms’ standpoint. This is interesting for 
two reasons. First, our empirical analysis reported earlier showed no clear evidence in 
support of significant liquidity improvements. Second, in what concerns the issue of 
“structure simplification”, we cannot think of any rational motive to fundament this 
view. No theoretical arguments have been found in the literature to support a specific 
share par value objective. 
  Some  wealth  effects  -  options  c)  and  g)  -  were  apparently  intended  by  the 
managers of two firms only as the result of the split, but signaling effects or changes in 
dividend policy were generally not considered relevant. This raises the question as to 
how to rationally explain the abnormal returns described previously. 
  Regarding the costs of assembling the operation (Question 3) the companies 
refused to respond or gave indication that the costs were negligible. 
  Reinforcing our conclusions from our earlier empirical analysis which revealed 
that liquidity improvements were far from clear, the answers to question 4 showed that 
five out of the eight companies considered that liquidity indeed had not improved after 
the split
40. Question 5 tried to shed some further light on this issue by asking firms their 
view on the indicators on which they based their conclusion on liquidity. The answers to 
this question are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 12 – Answers to Question 5 of the Questionnaire 
Liquidity indicators considered by firms to be relevant 
 
                                                
39 For those companies that didn’t place a score in a particular objective “0” was considered to compute 
the mean score for the sample. 
40 Other events could have determined no liquidity increases, not directly related to the stock split itself 
(for example, the beginning of a bear market could have started a period of lower liquidity). 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
Relative bid-ask 5 3 0 0
Number of shares traded 3 5 5 5 4 2








  The results in Table 12 coupled with the answers to question 2 showed that three 
firms considered that liquidity improvements had resulted from increases in the number 
of  shares  and  volume  (euro)  traded  while  only  one  considered  that  liquidity  had 
increased due to changes in the relative bid-ask spread.  
  Of the four responses obtained concerning volatility changes (Question 6), all 
the firms agree in the inexistence of any observable volatility increases after the split. 
  The answers to Question 7 revealed that no company was planning to engage in 
new stock splits in the coming months. 
  Table 13 shows the results for Question 8, which asked firms whether their split 
objectives had been met in practice: 
 
Table 13 – Answers to Question 8 of the Questionnaire 
Stated Success in meeting the split’s objectives 
(0=failure; 5=fully met) 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 Mean
a) Liquidity increases 5 0 0 2 3 5 4 0 2,375
b) Increase in the number of shareholders 1 0 4 0 3 5 0 3 2,000
c) Create wealth for shareholders 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0,500
d) Place the price closer to an "ideal" value, lower than the previous 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0,375
e) Signal confidence 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,125
f) Structure simplification (e.g., 1 EUR per share) 5 3 5 4 5 0 5 5 4,000
g) Allow a more favourable price evolution 5 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 1,500
h) Facilitate changes in dividend policy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,125  
 
  As to the success in reaching the objectives, the above responses concerning 
structure  simplification  were  a  self-fulfillment.  The  mean  score  was  high  and  each 
individual score obtained in question 2 was almost replicated in this matter for Question 
8. Coherently, companies that claimed that liquidity had increased (C1, C6 and C7) 
after  the  split  gave  a  mean  4.66  score  to  option  a).  Increase  in  the  number  of 
shareholders had a weak 2.0 mean score while all other objectives had negligible mean 
scores. 
  Concerning  the  issue  of  a  possible  optimal  trading  range  for  prices  in  the 
Portuguese stock market (Question 9), three firms responded that they believed such 
range did not exist. Two didn’t respond. Each of the other three gave different answers. 
None of these claimed the optimal trading range to be above the EUR 10.00 threshold 
(where the mean price levels are found for the other international exchanges analyzed in 






  Finally, Question 10 inquired firms on the importance of stock splits in different 
cycles of price changes (bull versus bear markets). The mean scores for the companies 
that responded gave a clearer importance to splits during periods of rising prices (2.86 
versus 1.86). Thus, it seems that firms think that that when prices go higher in absolute 
terms this will be apparently the most appropriate time to reduce the absolute values of 
their shares.  
  In  brief,  it  seems  that  “structure  simplification”  was  the  most  important 
objective stated by firms (and the one really achieved). Liquidity changes were far from 
being confirmed as a main accomplished objective. There is no evidence pointing to the 
existence of signaling motivations surrounding splits. Since structure simplification (as 
defined)  should  have  no  material  effect  on  prices  it  is  indeed  hard  to  explain  the 
observed abnormal returns. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
  For a simple “cosmetic” event, stock splits are quite a puzzling event. Our paper 
confirmed the existence of relevant wealth effects associated with stock splits in the 
Portuguese market. So the answer to the question in the title of this paper is at least 
partially achieved. 
  The existing body of literature (mainly concerning U.S. markets) is extensive 
and has been especially dedicated to the liquidity effects and abnormal returns around 
announcement and ex-dates. 
  Our evidence concerning liquidity changes induced by splits has allowed us to 
conclude that there are some weak effects only. Our sample of Portuguese splits shows 
no  significant  increase  in  volume,  either  measured  in  adjusted  (by  the  split  factor) 
number of shares or the amount traded. Similar to what has been found by most authors, 
the number of trades seems to increase, lending some support to the hypothesis that the 
trading by small investors increases post-split. In terms of relative bid-ask spreads, the 
results  do  not  support  the  occurrence  of  statistically  significant  changes.  Removing 
from the sample the companies that had pre and/or post-split relative bid-ask spreads 
higher  than  3.5%  shows  significant  increases  both  for  the  mean  as  well  as  for  the 






  Our  research  documents  important  price  effects  around  stock  splits  at  the 
announcement  (5-day  CAR  of  3.8%) and ex-dates  (7.3%),  which  is consistent  with 
much previous literature. A puzzling feature in our results, however, is that the ex-date 
CAR are larger than those observed at the announcement day. There is no parallel for 
this  in  the  available  literature.  These  results  are  robust  to  the  removal  of  the  most 
obvious outliers from the sample. 
  We  also  show  that  changes  in  liquidity  do  not  seem  to  be  correlated  with 
abnormal returns. Several possible alternative explanations related to potential signaling 
effects were investigated. None of those explanations was supported by our data. These 
were the changes in the companies’ systematic risk, changes in EPS growth rates and 
the prediction of a continuum upward momentum for the shares’ price. A comparison of 
mean and median price levels for several stock exchanges showed that the price level 
for  the  Portuguese  market  is  clearly  below  that  of  its  European  counterparts.  This 
excludes the hypothesis of splits being a device used by managers to place the share 
price closer to European levels. This is even more surprising since the minimum tick 
size rules are relatively similar across countries. In fact these rules are identical for 
Euronext, the platform which is shared by the Portuguese stock exchange. 
  Our survey  directed at the  sample firms  confirmed the importance stated  by 
splitting firms of the objective of liquidity improvements. Consistent with our findings, 
the majority of companies admitted, however, that the split had not caused liquidity 
improvements. The other major objective pointed out by companies was that of share 
capital simplification. That possibility was included in the survey, since most companies 
have a par value for each share of EUR 1, when previously all firms (with just one 
exception) had a share par value of 1,000 PTE (or 4,99 EUR). The importance granted 
by managers to this objective is puzzling, since the par value of each share should be 
completely irrelevant in real terms, especially since we found no clear liquidity benefits.  
  Our research leaves us with several unanswered questions. We believe that intra-
day  trading  analysis  of  microstructure  effects  is  a  possibility  that  might  help  us  to 
understand  the  puzzling  feature  of  positive  ex-date  price  effects  that  outpace  those 
observed for the announcement date. Another area that could be promising and where 
little work has been produced is the international comparison of different Eurozone 







Brown and Warner (1985) test statistic formula 
 
The authors propose this statistic in the case where cross-sectional dependence in excess 
returns  is  suspected  to  exist.  The  average  abnormal  return  (AAR)  at  moment  t  is 
computed as follows (N represents the number of events, i.e. in my work the number of 














The Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for up to T periods after the event 
















The test statistic is (L is the number of trading days used in the estimation of the model 
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Annex 1 – Abnormal Returns using Trade-to-Trade Approach and Last Bid Prices 
 
3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days 3 days 5 days
BCP -1,249% -1,403% -1,338% -2,178% -1,266% -1,366% -0,277% -1,118%
t observed -0,550 -0,478 -0,345 -0,753 -0,558 -0,467 -0,128 -0,400
BPA -1,692% 0,559% 9,726% 8,890% -1,847% 0,581% 9,699% 9,262%
t observed -0,281 0,072 2,405 2,949 -0,307 0,075 4,266 3,155
BPI 1,218% 2,162% -2,422% 0,936% 2,405% 3,166% -3,077% -0,306%
t observed 0,434 0,596 -0,463 0,240 0,879 0,897 -1,045 -0,081
Brisa 3,456% 4,165% -3,360% -6,303% 3,318% 3,380% -2,358% -5,475%
t observed 1,438 1,342 -0,831 -2,092 1,627 1,283 -1,054 -1,895
Brisa Priv 0,425% 1,867% -0,956% -2,940% 0,164% 0,488% 1,085% -1,289%
t observed 0,112 0,381 -0,160 -0,662 0,053 0,123 0,341 -0,314
Celulose Caima 1,187% 2,804% -1,040% -2,212% 1,216% 2,600% -2,059% -0,771%
t observed 0,278 0,509 -0,068 -0,193 0,295 0,489 -0,236 -0,068
Cimpor -0,311% 0,379% -0,821% 0,344% -0,215% 1,303% 0,040% 1,439%
t observed -0,117 0,110 -0,184 0,104 -0,090 0,423 0,018 0,510
CIN -3,649% -6,564% -0,358% 0,968% -2,396% -4,978% 1,052% 4,514%
t observed -0,882 -1,229 -0,054 0,197 -0,596 -0,958 0,288 0,956
Cires 17,507% 9,610% -7,353% -6,686% 19,174% 10,408% -7,602% -6,686%
t observed 3,198 1,360 -0,735 -0,897 3,545 1,490 -1,369 -0,933
Cofina 6,881% 15,847% 1,628% 1,843% 7,962% 17,485% 1,528% 2,977%
t observed 1,386 2,473 0,135 0,204 1,633 2,778 0,224 0,338
Cort Amorim 4,123% 4,298% 4,663% 5,949% 3,902% 3,609% 3,918% 3,600%
t observed 1,593 1,287 1,042 1,784 1,932 1,384 1,950 1,388
Colep 1,281% 0,595% 3,623% 6,475% 1,529% 0,621% 4,023% 7,150%
t observed 0,419 0,151 0,593 1,421 0,501 0,158 1,192 1,641
EDP 2,056% 3,306% -1,001% -0,938% 2,130% 3,540% -0,479% -0,440%
t observed 0,892 1,111 -0,240 -0,302 0,942 1,212 -0,210 -0,149
Finibanco 4,432% 4,258% 0,952% 4,735% 1,644% 2,702% 1,416% 5,656%
t observed 1,188 0,884 0,206 1,377 0,462 0,588 0,620 1,917
Ibersol -6,473% 0,463% -4,562% -0,426% -6,450% -0,268% -4,621% -0,173%
t observed -1,365 0,076 -0,648 -0,081 -1,376 -0,044 -1,156 -0,033
Modelo Continente 0,027% -0,290% 2,056% 0,267% -1,048% -1,889% 1,685% 0,340%
t observed 0,010 -0,085 0,399 0,070 -0,414 -0,578 0,577 0,090
Mota Engil -4,762% -3,650% -1,281% -4,195% -7,554% -5,016% -1,305% -4,230%
t observed -1,056 -0,627 -0,137 -0,604 -1,836 -0,944 -0,255 -0,639
Portucel 7,341% 4,787% 1,749% -0,370% 6,959% 5,132% 1,133% -0,293%
t observed 2,403 1,214 0,379 -0,108 2,340 1,337 0,457 -0,092
Portugal Telecom -8,756% -10,518% 2,995% 0,828% -9,251% -9,738% 2,551% 0,456%
t observed -2,977 -2,770 0,610 0,227 -3,276 -2,671 0,903 0,125
SAG 1,352% 0,279% -0,080% 0,862% 1,082% -0,010% -1,023% -0,854%
t observed 0,446 0,071 -0,014 0,201 0,360 -0,002 -0,329 -0,213
Salvador Caetano 2,075% 4,073% -15,096% -12,000% 0,523% 1,096% -11,508% -7,382%
t observed 0,435 0,661 -1,854 -1,977 0,115 0,187 -2,515 -1,250
Semapa  -4,176% -4,760% -1,359% -3,572% -2,073% -2,053% -1,583% -4,551%
t observed -1,646 -1,453 -0,278 -0,979 -0,911 -0,699 -0,643 -1,433
Sonae SGPS 0,312% -0,026% -2,717% -3,311% -0,716% -0,545% -1,653% -1,429%
t observed 0,116 -0,007 -0,474 -0,774 -0,272 -0,160 -0,522 -0,350
Teixeira Duarte 3,596% -0,612% 0,095% 3,349% -0,981% -7,470% -0,446% 1,657%
t observed 1,215 -0,160 0,013 0,623 -0,442 -2,605 -0,126 0,362
Telecel 2,516% 2,365% 7,248% 7,996% 2,718% 2,658% 6,729% 7,133%
t observed 0,581 0,423 1,257 1,861 0,634 0,480 2,039 1,674
V&A -1,600% -0,279% 7,986% 28,539% -0,216% 1,826% 8,189% 29,002%
t observed -0,413 -0,056 1,133 5,430 -0,062 0,408 2,122 5,822
Average Ab. Return 3,158% 2,817% 4,619% 7,887% 3,115% 2,788% 7,738% 7,615%
Std Deviation 0,007 0,010 0,008 0,011 0,007 0,009 0,008 0,010
t observed 2,43 1,68 3,20 4,23 2,51 1,74 5,78 4,40
p-value 0,0149 0,0926 0,0014 0,0000 0,0122 0,0822 0,0000 0,0000
Non-Adjusted CumulativeAbnormal Returns Adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns










1 – Em termos aproximados, qual o tempo que mediou entre o início dos estudos da 
operação e o seu anúncio? 
a)  inferior a 15 dias; 
b)  superior a 15 dias e inferior a 1 mês; 
c)  superior a 1 mês e inferior a 3 meses; 
d)  superior a 3 meses. 
 
 
2  –  Qual  os  principais  objectivos  que  estiveram  na  base  da  decisão  (0  =  sem 
importância; 5 = Muito importante)? 
 
a)  aumentar a liquidez   
b)  aumentar a base de accionistas   
c)  criar valor para os accionistas   
d)  aproximar o preço de um “valor ideal”, mais baixo que o actual   
e)  transmitir um sinal de confiança ao mercado   
f)  simplicação de estrutura (ex: 1 EUR por acção)   
g)  permitir uma evolução mais favorável da cotação   
h)  facilitar uma eventual alteração da política de dividendos   
i)  Outros (especificar)   
 
3 – Quais os custos directos e indirectos (em EUR) de montagem da operação? 
 
 
4 – Consideram que o nível de liquidez em bolsa aumentou após a operação?  
 
5 – Em relação à resposta à questão anterior, que indicadores a fundamentam? (0 = sem 
importância; 5 = Muito importante) 
 
a)  bid-ask relativo
1   
b)  nº de acções transaccionadas   
c)  volume de transacções diário (medido em EUR)   
d)  custo simples/ponderado do spread
2   
g)  outros (especificar)   
     
 
                                                
1 Medido por: a diferença entre o preço ask (melhor preço de venda) e o preço bid (melhor preço de 
compra), no fecho da sessão, dividida pelo preço bid no fecho 
2 Custo simples: medido pelo valor absoluto da diferença entre o preço de fecho e o preço médio (entre o 
preço bid e o preço ask), dividido por este preço médio. Se medido para várias sessões de bolsa, a 
ponderação atribuída a cada uma é idêntica. Custo ponderado: o mesmo que o anterior, mas cada sessão é 
ponderada pelas quantidades ou montante transaccionados nessa sessão em relação às quantidades ou 









6  –  Consideram  que  a  volatilidade  aumentou  após  a  realização  da  operação?  Que 
indicadores fundamentam a V. resposta? 
 
 
7 – Planeiam realizar algum stock split nos próximos meses? Se sim, qual o split factor 
que estão a pensar utilizar? 
 
 
8 – Que grau de sucesso atribuem ao cumprimento dos objectivos identificados acima? 
(0 = nada atingido; 5 = completamente atingido) 
 
a)  aumentar a liquidez   
b)  aumentar a base de accionistas   
c)  criar valor para os accionistas   
d)  aproximar o preço de um “valor ideal”, mais baixo que o actual   
e)  transmitir um sinal de confiança ao mercado   
f)  simplicação de estrutura (ex: 1 EUR por acção)   
g)  permitir uma evolução mais favorável da cotação   
h)  facilitar uma eventual alteração da política de dividendos   
i)  Outros (especificar)   
 
 
9 – Qual pensam ser o range óptimo de preço na bolsa nacional em (EUR)? 
a)  Inferior a 2,50; 
b)  Igual ou Superior a 2,50 e inferior a 5,00; 
c)  Igual ou superior a 5,00 e inferior a 10,00; 
d)  Igual ou superior a 10,00 e inferior a 15,00; 
e)  Igual ou superior a 15,00 e inferior a 20,00; 
f)  Igual ou superior a 20,00 
g)  Não existe um range óptimo para o preço da acção. 
 
10  –  Qual  a  importância  global  que  atribui  às  operações  de  stock  split?  (0  =  sem 
importância; 5 = Muito importante) 
a)  Numa conjuntura altista das cotações (bull market)   











1 – Approximately how long did it take between the initiation of the stock split studies 
and its announcement? 
e)  less than 15 days; 
f)  more than 15 days but less than a month; 
g)  more than a month but less than 3 months; 
h)  more than 3 months. 
 
 
2  –  What  were  the  major  objectives  behind  the  decision  to  split  shares?  (0  = 
unimportant; 5 = very important)? 
 
a)  liquidity increases   
b)  increase the number of shareholder   
c)  create wealth for shareholders   
d)  place the price closer to an "ideal" value, lower than the previous   
e)  signal confidence   
f)  structure simplification (e.g., 1 EUR per share)   
g)  allow a more favourable price evolution   
h)  facilitate changes in dividend policy   
i)  other reasons (specify)   
 
3 – What were the direct and indirect costs of the split transaction (in EUR)? 
 
4 – Do you feel that the liquidity levels of your firm’s shares increased after the split?  
 
5 – Regarding your answer to 4., on which indicators did you base your opinion? (0 = 
unimportant; 5 = very important) 
 
a)  Relative bid-ask 
1   
b)  Number of shares traded   
c)  Daily volume (in EUR)   
d)  Simple / weighted spread cost
2   
g)  other (specify)   
     
 
 
                                                
1 Measured as: difference between the ask price (better selling price) and bid price (better buying price) at 
the end of the trading session, divided by the closing bid price. 
2 Simple cost: measured as the absolute value of the difference between the closing price and the mean 
price (of the bid and ask prices) , divided by such mean price. If measured for several trading sessions, 
identical weights are given to each session. Weighted costs: the same as before, but each session is 








6  – Do you feel  that price volatility increased following  the stock split? On which 
indicators do you base your answer? 
 
 
7 – Is your firm planning to do a stock split in the coming months? If so, what split 
factor are you intending to use? 
 
 
8 – How successful was the stock split operation in reaching the objectives identified in 
question 2? (0 = failure 5 = fully reached) 
 
a)  liquidity increases   
b)  increase the number of shareholder   
c)  create wealth for shareholders   
d)  place the price closer to an "ideal" value, lower than the previous   
e)  signal confidence   
f)  structure simplification (e.g., 1 EUR per share)   
g)  allow a more favourable price evolution   
h)  facilitate changes in dividend policy   
i)  other reasons (specify)   
 
9  –  Which  of  the  following  do  you  think  is  an  ideal  price  range  for shares  in  the 
Portuguese exchange (EUR)? 
h)  Less than  2,50; 
i)  Equal to or more than 2,50 but less than 5,00; 
j)  Equal to or more than 5,00 but less than 10,00; 
k)  Equal to or more than 10,00 but less than 15,00; 
l)  Equal to or more than 15,00 but less than 20,00; 
m) Equal to or more than 20,00 
n)  There is not ideal price range. 
 
10 – What is the global importance of stock split transactions? (0 = unimportant; 5 = 
very important) 
a)  In  an  environment  where  the  stock  market  is  generally  buoyant  (bull 
market) 
 
b)  In an environment where the stock market is generally depressed (bear 
market) 
 
 
 
 